On Sun, Aug 18, 2019 at 08:58:12AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote: > On Sun, Aug 18, 2019 at 11:11:54AM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote: > > Note that of the mainstream file systems, ext4 and xfs don't guarantee > > that it's safe to blindly take maliciously provided file systems, such > > as those provided by a untrusted container, and mount it on a file > > system without problems. As I recall, one of the XFS developers > > described file system fuzzing reports as a denial of service attack on > > the developers. > > I think this greatly misrepresents the general attitute of the XFS > developers. We take sanity checks for the modern v5 on disk format > very series, and put a lot of effort into handling corrupted file > systems as good as possible, although there are of course no guaranteeѕ. > > The quote that you've taken out of context is for the legacy v4 format > that has no checksums and other integrity features. Ted's observation was about maliciously-crafted filesystems, though, so integrity-only features such as metadata checksums are irrelevant. Also the filesystem version is irrelevant; anything accepted by the kernel code (even if it's legacy/deprecated) is open attack surface. I personally consider it *mandatory* that we deal with this stuff. But I can understand that we don't do a good job at it, so we shouldn't hold a new filesystem to an unfairly high standard relative to other filesystems... - Eric _______________________________________________ devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://driverdev.linuxdriverproject.org/mailman/listinfo/driverdev-devel
