Fixes checkpatch.pl alignment warnings.
Signed-off-by: Simon Sandström <simon@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
index 1fc0b05ea0d5..146173b8cbb9 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
@@ -93,14 +93,14 @@ static void ssi_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Clearing context @%p for %s\n",
- crypto_aead_ctx(tfm), crypto_tfm_alg_name(&(tfm->base)));
+ crypto_aead_ctx(tfm), crypto_tfm_alg_name(&(tfm->base)));
dev = &ctx->drvdata->plat_dev->dev;
/* Unmap enckey buffer */
if (ctx->enckey) {
dma_free_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, ctx->enckey, ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Freed enckey DMA buffer enckey_dma_addr=0x%llX\n",
- (unsigned long long)ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
+ (unsigned long long)ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
ctx->enckey_dma_addr = 0;
ctx->enckey = NULL;
}
@@ -108,29 +108,29 @@ static void ssi_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) { /* XCBC authetication */
if (ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys) {
dma_free_coherent(dev, CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE * 3,
- ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys,
- ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr);
+ ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys,
+ ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr);
}
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Freed xcbc_keys DMA buffer xcbc_keys_dma_addr=0x%llX\n",
- (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr);
+ (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr);
ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr = 0;
ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys = NULL;
} else if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* HMAC auth. */
if (ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad) {
dma_free_coherent(dev, 2 * MAX_HMAC_DIGEST_SIZE,
- ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad,
- ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr);
+ ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad,
+ ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr);
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Freed ipad_opad DMA buffer ipad_opad_dma_addr=0x%llX\n",
- (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr);
+ (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr);
ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr = 0;
ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad = NULL;
}
if (ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey) {
dma_free_coherent(dev, MAX_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE,
- ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey,
- ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr);
+ ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey,
+ ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr);
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Freed padded_authkey DMA buffer padded_authkey_dma_addr=0x%llX\n",
- (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr);
+ (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr);
ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr = 0;
ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey = NULL;
}
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int ssi_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
goto init_failed;
}
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Allocated authkey buffer in context ctx->authkey=@%p\n",
- ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad);
+ ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad);
ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey = dma_alloc_coherent(dev,
MAX_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE,
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static void ssi_aead_complete(struct device *dev, void *ssi_req, void __iomem *c
if (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
if (memcmp(areq_ctx->mac_buf, areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr,
- ctx->authsize) != 0) {
+ ctx->authsize) != 0) {
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Payload authentication failure, "
"(auth-size=%d, cipher=%d).\n",
ctx->authsize, ctx->cipher_mode);
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static int hmac_setkey(struct cc_hw_desc *desc, struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx)
static int validate_keys_sizes(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx)
{
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("enc_keylen=%u authkeylen=%u\n",
- ctx->enc_keylen, ctx->auth_keylen);
+ ctx->enc_keylen, ctx->auth_keylen);
switch (ctx->auth_mode) {
case DRV_HASH_SHA1:
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static int validate_keys_sizes(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx)
if (unlikely(ctx->flow_mode == S_DIN_to_DES)) {
if (ctx->enc_keylen != DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE) {
SSI_LOG_ERR("Invalid cipher(3DES) key size: %u\n",
- ctx->enc_keylen);
+ ctx->enc_keylen);
return -EINVAL;
}
} else { /* Default assumed to be AES ciphers */
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static int validate_keys_sizes(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx)
(ctx->enc_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192) &&
(ctx->enc_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256)) {
SSI_LOG_ERR("Invalid cipher(AES) key size: %u\n",
- ctx->enc_keylen);
+ ctx->enc_keylen);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ ssi_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
int seq_len = 0, rc = -EINVAL;
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Setting key in context @%p for %s. key=%p keylen=%u\n",
- ctx, crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), key, keylen);
+ ctx, crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)),
+ key, keylen);
CHECK_AND_RETURN_UPON_FIPS_ERROR();
/* STAT_PHASE_0: Init and sanity checks */
@@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ static int ssi_aead_setauthsize(
#if SSI_CC_HAS_AES_CCM
static int ssi_rfc4309_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
- unsigned int authsize)
+ unsigned int authsize)
{
switch (authsize) {
case 8:
@@ -684,7 +685,7 @@ static int ssi_rfc4309_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
}
static int ssi_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
- unsigned int authsize)
+ unsigned int authsize)
{
switch (authsize) {
case 4:
@@ -1168,8 +1169,8 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_load_mlli_to_sram(
(req_ctx->data_buff_type == SSI_DMA_BUF_MLLI) ||
!req_ctx->is_single_pass)) {
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Copy-to-sram: mlli_dma=%08x, mlli_size=%u\n",
- (unsigned int)ctx->drvdata->mlli_sram_addr,
- req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_len);
+ (unsigned int)ctx->drvdata->mlli_sram_addr,
+ req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_len);
/* Copy MLLI table host-to-sram */
hw_desc_init(&desc[*seq_size]);
set_din_type(&desc[*seq_size], DMA_DLLI,
@@ -1313,7 +1314,8 @@ ssi_aead_xcbc_authenc(
}
static int validate_data_size(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx,
- enum drv_crypto_direction direct, struct aead_request *req)
+ enum drv_crypto_direction direct,
+ struct aead_request *req)
{
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
unsigned int assoclen = req->assoclen;
@@ -1321,7 +1323,7 @@ static int validate_data_size(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx,
(req->cryptlen - ctx->authsize) : req->cryptlen;
if (unlikely((direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) &&
- (req->cryptlen < ctx->authsize)))
+ (req->cryptlen < ctx->authsize)))
goto data_size_err;
areq_ctx->is_single_pass = true; /*defaulted to fast flow*/
@@ -1329,7 +1331,7 @@ static int validate_data_size(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx,
switch (ctx->flow_mode) {
case S_DIN_to_AES:
if (unlikely((ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CBC) &&
- !IS_ALIGNED(cipherlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)))
+ !IS_ALIGNED(cipherlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)))
goto data_size_err;
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM)
break;
@@ -1944,8 +1946,9 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction
struct ssi_crypto_req ssi_req = {};
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("%s context=%p req=%p iv=%p src=%p src_ofs=%d dst=%p dst_ofs=%d cryptolen=%d\n",
- ((direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ? "Encrypt" : "Decrypt"), ctx, req, req->iv,
- sg_virt(req->src), req->src->offset, sg_virt(req->dst), req->dst->offset, req->cryptlen);
+ ((direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ? "Encrypt" : "Decrypt"),
+ ctx, req, req->iv, sg_virt(req->src), req->src->offset,
+ sg_virt(req->dst), req->dst->offset, req->cryptlen);
CHECK_AND_RETURN_UPON_FIPS_ERROR();
/* STAT_PHASE_0: Init and sanity checks */
@@ -1953,7 +1956,7 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction
/* Check data length according to mode */
if (unlikely(validate_data_size(ctx, direct, req) != 0)) {
SSI_LOG_ERR("Unsupported crypt/assoc len %d/%d.\n",
- req->cryptlen, req->assoclen);
+ req->cryptlen, req->assoclen);
crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_BLOCK_LEN);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -1976,7 +1979,7 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, ctx->ctr_nonce, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
if (!areq_ctx->backup_giv) /*User none-generated IV*/
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE,
- req->iv, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
+ req->iv, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
/* Initialize counter portion of counter block */
*(__be32 *)(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE +
CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE) = cpu_to_be32(1);
@@ -2230,7 +2233,7 @@ static int ssi_rfc4543_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsign
}
static int ssi_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
- unsigned int authsize)
+ unsigned int authsize)
{
switch (authsize) {
case 4:
@@ -2249,7 +2252,7 @@ static int ssi_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
}
static int ssi_rfc4106_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
- unsigned int authsize)
+ unsigned int authsize)
{
SSI_LOG_DEBUG("ssi_rfc4106_gcm_setauthsize() authsize %d\n", authsize);
@@ -2720,14 +2723,14 @@ int ssi_aead_alloc(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata)
if (IS_ERR(t_alg)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(t_alg);
SSI_LOG_ERR("%s alg allocation failed\n",
- aead_algs[alg].driver_name);
+ aead_algs[alg].driver_name);
goto fail1;
}
t_alg->drvdata = drvdata;
rc = crypto_register_aead(&t_alg->aead_alg);
if (unlikely(rc != 0)) {
SSI_LOG_ERR("%s alg registration failed\n",
- t_alg->aead_alg.base.cra_driver_name);
+ t_alg->aead_alg.base.cra_driver_name);
goto fail2;
} else {
list_add_tail(&t_alg->entry, &aead_handle->aead_list);
--
2.11.0
_______________________________________________
devel mailing list
devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://driverdev.linuxdriverproject.org/mailman/listinfo/driverdev-devel
