Hi Jon,
Apologies for late reply, memorial day holidays and all...
On Wed, May 26, 2021 at 04:52:10PM -0600, Jonathan Corbet wrote:
> "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
> > Now that core scheduling is merged, update the documentation.
>
> Yay documentation!
What can I say, it is important and necessary as much as it is boring ;-)
> A couple of nits...
>
> > Co-developed-by: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Co-developed-by: Josh Don <joshdon@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Josh Don <joshdon@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: mingo@xxxxxxxxxx
> > Cc: peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > ---
> > .../admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 211 ++++++++++++++++++
> > Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 +
>
> As I understand it, there are use cases for core scheduling that go well
> beyond dancing around hardware vulnerabilities. So do we really want to
> bury the documentation for this feature there? To me it seems like the
> user-space API manual might be a better place, but perhaps I'm missing
> something.
True. But I would say the "main usecase" is security. So perhaps it is better
to house it here, with a slight reference to other usecases - if that's ok
with you.
> > 2 files changed, 212 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..585edf16183b
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
> > @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
> > +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +
> > +Core Scheduling
> > +***************
>
> We have a nicely laid-out set of conventions for subsection headings,
> described in Documentation/doc-guide/sphinx.rst; it would be nice if
> this document would conform to that.
Ok, I will go through that. Sorry and thanks.
> > +Core scheduling support allows userspace to define groups of tasks that can
> > +share a core. These groups can be specified either for security usecases (one
> > +group of tasks don't trust another), or for performance usecases (some
> > +workloads may benefit from running on the same core as they don't need the same
> > +hardware resources of the shared core, or may prefer different cores if they
> > +do share hardware resource needs). This document only describes the security
> > +usecase.
> > +
> > +Security usecase
> > +----------------
> > +A cross-HT attack involves the attacker and victim running on different Hyper
> > +Threads of the same core. MDS and L1TF are examples of such attacks. The only
> > +full mitigation of cross-HT attacks is to disable Hyper Threading (HT). Core
> > +scheduling is a scheduler feature that can mitigate some (not all) cross-HT
> > +attacks. It allows HT to be turned on safely by ensuring that tasks in a
>
> by ensuring that *only* tasks in a trusted group ... right?
Yes, ok.
> > +user-designated trusted group can share a core. This increase in core sharing
> > +can also improve performance, however it is not guaranteed that performance
> > +will always improve, though that is seen to be the case with a number of real
> > +world workloads. In theory, core scheduling aims to perform at least as good as
>
> s/good/well/
Ok.
> > +when Hyper Threading is disabled. In practice, this is mostly the case though
> > +not always: as synchronizing scheduling decisions across 2 or more CPUs in a
> > +core involves additional overhead - especially when the system is lightly
> > +loaded. When ``total_threads <= N_CPUS/2``, the extra overhead may cause core
> > +scheduling to perform more poorly compared to SMT-disabled, where N_CPUS is the
> > +total number of CPUs. Please measure the performance of your workloads always.
> > +
> > +Usage
> > +-----
> > +Core scheduling support is enabled via the ``CONFIG_SCHED_CORE`` config option.
>
> The use of ``literal text`` markup isn't necessary here, and is known to
> irritate some people.
Ok.
> > +Using this feature, userspace defines groups of tasks that can be co-scheduled
> > +on the same core. The core scheduler uses this information to make sure that
> > +tasks that are not in the same group never run simultaneously on a core, while
> > +doing its best to satisfy the system's scheduling requirements.
> > +
> > +Core scheduling can be enabled via the ``PR_SCHED_CORE`` prctl interface.
> > +This interface provides support for the creation of core scheduling groups, as
> > +well as admission and removal of tasks from created groups.
> > +
> > +::
>
> I'd just say "from created groups::" and leave off the separate "::" line.
Ok sure.
> > +
> > + #include <sys/prctl.h>
> > +
> > + int prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> > + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
> > +
> > +option:
> > + ``PR_SCHED_CORE``
>
> Did you want that to be in the literal block? If you don't indent it
> that won't work. If you *do* want it, you really don't need the literal
> markup.
makes sense, I did want it literal. Will drop quotes.
> > +
> > +arg2:
> > + Command for operation, must be one off:
> > + - ``PR_SCHED_CORE_GET 0 -- get core_sched cookie of ``pid``.
> > + - ``PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE 1 -- create a new unique cookie for ``pid``.
> > + - ``PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO 2 -- push core_sched cookie to ``pid``.
> > + - ``PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM 3 -- pull core_sched cookie from ``pid``.
> > +
> > +arg3:
> > + ``pid`` of the task for which the operation applies.
> > +
> > +arg4:
> > + ``pid_type`` for which the operation applies. It is of type ``enum pid_type``.
> > + For example, if arg4 is ``PIDTYPE_TGID``, then the operation of this command
> > + will be performed for all tasks in the task group of ``pid``.
> > +
> > +arg5:
> > + userspace pointer to an unsigned long for storing the cookie returned by
> > + ``PR_SCHED_CORE_GET`` command. Should be 0 for all other commands.
> > +
> > +Cookie Transferral
> > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > +Transferring a cookie between the current and other tasks is possible using
> > +PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM and PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO to inherit a cookie from a
> > +specified task or a share a cookie with a task. In combination this allows a
> > +simple helper program to pull a cookie from a task in an existing core
> > +scheduling group and share it with already running tasks.
>
> There must be some sort of security model here, right? You can't just
> steal somebody else's cookies, even if they are the yummy chocolate-chip
> variety. It would be good to say what the policy is.
Yeah. It is enforced by these ptrace checks in the code. I will add some info
about it:
/*
* Check if this process has the right to modify the specified
* process. Use the regular "ptrace_may_access()" checks.
*/
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
> > +Design/Implementation
> > +---------------------
> > +Each task that is tagged is assigned a cookie internally in the kernel. As
> > +mentioned in `Usage`_, tasks with the same cookie value are assumed to trust
> > +each other and share a core.
> > +
> > +The basic idea is that, every schedule event tries to select tasks for all the
> > +siblings of a core such that all the selected tasks running on a core are
> > +trusted (same cookie) at any point in time. Kernel threads are assumed trusted.
>
> ...and kernel threads trust random user tasks too? Interesting.
Not if those untrusted random kernel tasks are assigned a cookie.
> > +The idle task is considered special, as it trusts everything and everything
> > +trusts it.
> > +
> > +During a schedule() event on any sibling of a core, the highest priority task on
> > +the sibling's core is picked and assigned to the sibling calling schedule(), if
> > +the sibling has the task enqueued. For rest of the siblings in the core,
> > +highest priority task with the same cookie is selected if there is one runnable
> > +in their individual run queues. If a task with same cookie is not available,
> > +the idle task is selected. Idle task is globally trusted.
> > +
> > +Once a task has been selected for all the siblings in the core, an IPI is sent to
> > +siblings for whom a new task was selected. Siblings on receiving the IPI will
> > +switch to the new task immediately. If an idle task is selected for a sibling,
> > +then the sibling is considered to be in a `forced idle` state. I.e., it may
> > +have tasks on its on runqueue to run, however it will still have to run idle.
> > +More on this in the next section.
> > +
> > +Forced-idling of tasks
> > +----------------------
>
> You're idling *CPUs*, not tasks, right?
You are quite right, I'll correct the wording, thanks.
> > +The scheduler tries its best to find tasks that trust each other such that all
> > +tasks selected to be scheduled are of the highest priority in a core. However,
> > +it is possible that some runqueues had tasks that were incompatible with the
> > +highest priority ones in the core. Favoring security over fairness, one or more
> > +siblings could be forced to select a lower priority task if the highest
> > +priority task is not trusted with respect to the core wide highest priority
> > +task. If a sibling does not have a trusted task to run, it will be forced idle
> > +by the scheduler (idle thread is scheduled to run).
> > +
> > +When the highest priority task is selected to run, a reschedule-IPI is sent to
> > +the sibling to force it into idle. This results in 4 cases which need to be
> > +considered depending on whether a VM or a regular usermode process was running
> > +on either HT::
> > +
> > + HT1 (attack) HT2 (victim)
> > + A idle -> user space user space -> idle
> > + B idle -> user space guest -> idle
> > + C idle -> guest user space -> idle
> > + D idle -> guest guest -> idle
> > +
> > +Note that for better performance, we do not wait for the destination CPU
> > +(victim) to enter idle mode. This is because the sending of the IPI would bring
> > +the destination CPU immediately into kernel mode from user space, or VMEXIT
> > +in the case of guests. At best, this would only leak some scheduler metadata
> > +which may not be worth protecting. It is also possible that the IPI is received
> > +too late on some architectures, but this has not been observed in the case of
> > +x86.
> > +
> > +Trust model
> > +-----------
> > +Core scheduling maintains trust relationships amongst groups of tasks by
> > +assigning them a tag that is the same cookie value.
> > +When a system with core scheduling boots, all tasks are considered to trust
> > +each other. This is because the core scheduler does not have information about
> > +trust relationships until userspace uses the above mentioned interfaces, to
> > +communicate them. In other words, all tasks have a default cookie value of 0.
> > +and are considered system-wide trusted. The stunning of siblings running
>
> "stunning"? Is this idling or are you doing something more violent here?
Yes, idling would be easier to understand. "Stunning" is a term used in the
security circles to mean forced idling on incompatible CPUs. I will just
change it to "forced idling".
Will spin this patch soon with the corrections, thanks Jon!
-Joel
>
> > +cookie-0 tasks is also avoided.
>
> [...]
>
> Thanks,
>
> jon
