On Mon, Nov 02, 2020 at 12:53:15PM -0800, ira.weiny@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
> From: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> PKS allows kernel users to define domains of page mappings which have
> additional protections beyond the paging protections.
>
> Add an API to allocate, use, and free a protection key which identifies
> such a domain. Export 5 new symbols pks_key_alloc(), pks_mknoaccess(),
> pks_mkread(), pks_mkrdwr(), and pks_key_free(). Add 2 new macros;
> PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(key) and _PAGE_PKEY(pkey).
>
> Update the protection key documentation to cover pkeys on supervisor
> pages.
>
> Co-developed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@xxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@xxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> ---
> Changes from V1
> Per Dave Hansen
> Add flags to pks_key_alloc() to help future proof the
> interface if/when the key space is exhausted.
>
> Changes from RFC V3
> Per Dave Hansen
> Put WARN_ON_ONCE in pks_key_free()
> s/pks_mknoaccess/pks_mk_noaccess/
> s/pks_mkread/pks_mk_readonly/
> s/pks_mkrdwr/pks_mk_readwrite/
> Change return pks_key_alloc() to EOPNOTSUPP when not
> supported or configured
> Per Peter Zijlstra
> Remove unneeded preempt disable/enable
> ---
> Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst | 102 ++++++++++++++---
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 12 ++
> arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h | 11 ++
> arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h | 4 +
> arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/pgtable.h | 4 +
> include/linux/pkeys.h | 24 ++++
> 7 files changed, 265 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst b/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst
> index ec575e72d0b2..c4e6c480562f 100644
> --- a/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst
> @@ -4,25 +4,33 @@
> Memory Protection Keys
> ======================
>
> -Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a feature
> -which is found on Intel's Skylake (and later) "Scalable Processor"
> -Server CPUs. It will be available in future non-server Intel parts
> -and future AMD processors.
> -
> -For anyone wishing to test or use this feature, it is available in
> -Amazon's EC2 C5 instances and is known to work there using an Ubuntu
> -17.04 image.
> -
> Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based
> protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
> -when an application changes protection domains. It works by
> -dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a
> -"protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
> +when an application changes protection domains.
> +
> +PKeys Userspace (PKU) is a feature which is found on Intel's Skylake "Scalable
> +Processor" Server CPUs and later. And It will be available in future
> +non-server Intel parts and future AMD processors.
> +
> +Future Intel processors will support Protection Keys for Supervisor pages
> +(PKS).
> +
> +For anyone wishing to test or use user space pkeys, it is available in Amazon's
> +EC2 C5 instances and is known to work there using an Ubuntu 17.04 image.
> +
> +pkeys work by dedicating 4 previously Reserved bits in each page table entry to
> +a "protection key", giving 16 possible keys. User and Supervisor pages are
> +treated separately.
> +
> +Protections for each page are controlled with per CPU registers for each type
> +of page User and Supervisor. Each of these 32 bit register stores two separate
> +bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.
>
> -There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
> -bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key. Being a CPU
> -register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
> -thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
> +For Userspace the register is user-accessible (rdpkru/wrpkru). For
> +Supervisor, the register (MSR_IA32_PKRS) is accessible only to the kernel.
> +
> +Being a CPU register, pkeys are inherently thread-local, potentially giving
> +each thread an independent set of protections from every other thread.
>
> There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
> to the new register. The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
> @@ -30,8 +38,11 @@ even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs. These
> permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
> instruction fetches.
>
> -Syscalls
> -========
> +For kernel space rdmsr/wrmsr are used to access the kernel MSRs.
> +
> +
> +Syscalls for user space keys
> +============================
>
> There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys::
>
> @@ -98,3 +109,58 @@ with a read()::
> The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set
> to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when
> the plain mprotect() permissions are violated.
> +
> +
> +Kernel API for PKS support
> +==========================
> +
> +The following interface is used to allocate, use, and free a pkey which defines
> +a 'protection domain' within the kernel. Setting a pkey value in a supervisor
> +mapping adds that mapping to the protection domain.
> +
> + int pks_key_alloc(const char * const pkey_user, int flags);
> + #define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey)
> + #define _PAGE_KEY(pkey)
> + void pks_mk_noaccess(int pkey);
> + void pks_mk_readonly(int pkey);
> + void pks_mk_readwrite(int pkey);
> + void pks_key_free(int pkey);
> +
> +pks_key_alloc() allocates keys dynamically to allow better use of the limited
> +key space. 'flags' alter the allocation based on the users need. Currently
> +they can request an exclusive key.
> +
> +Callers of pks_key_alloc() _must_ be prepared for it to fail and take
> +appropriate action. This is due mainly to the fact that PKS may not be
> +available on all arch's. Failure to check the return of pks_key_alloc() and
> +using any of the rest of the API is undefined.
> +
> +Kernel users must set the PTE permissions in the page table entries for the
> +mappings they want to protect. This can be done with PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY() or
> +_PAGE_KEY().
> +
> +The pks_mk*() family of calls allows kernel users the ability to change the
> +protections for the domain identified by the pkey specified. 3 states are
> +available pks_mk_noaccess(), pks_mk_readonly(), and pks_mk_readwrite() which
> +set the access to none, read, and read/write respectively.
> +
> +Finally, pks_key_free() allows a user to return the key to the allocator for
> +use by others.
> +
> +The interface maintains pks_mk_noaccess() (Access Disabled (AD=1)) for all keys
> +not currently allocated. Therefore, the user can depend on access being
> +disabled when pks_key_alloc() returns a key and the user should remove mappings
> +from the domain (remove the pkey from the PTE) prior to calling pks_key_free().
> +
> +It should be noted that the underlying WRMSR(MSR_IA32_PKRS) is not serializing
> +but still maintains ordering properties similar to WRPKRU. Thus it is safe to
> +immediately use a mapping when the pks_mk*() functions returns.
> +
> +The current SDM section on PKRS needs updating but should be the same as that
> +of WRPKRU. So to quote from the WRPKRU text:
> +
> + WRPKRU will never execute transiently. Memory accesses
> + affected by PKRU register will not execute (even transiently)
> + until all prior executions of WRPKRU have completed execution
> + and updated the PKRU register.
> +
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> index 816b31c68550..c9fdfbdcbbfb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> @@ -73,6 +73,12 @@
> _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 | \
> _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3)
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
> +#define _PAGE_PKEY(pkey) (_AT(pteval_t, pkey) << _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0)
> +#else
> +#define _PAGE_PKEY(pkey) (_AT(pteval_t, 0))
> +#endif
> +
> #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) || defined(CONFIG_X86_PAE)
> #define _PAGE_KNL_ERRATUM_MASK (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
> #else
> @@ -229,6 +235,12 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
> #define PAGE_KERNEL_IO __pgprot_mask(__PAGE_KERNEL_IO)
> #define PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE __pgprot_mask(__PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE)
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
> +#define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey) __pgprot_mask(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_PKEY(pkey))
> +#else
> +#define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey) PAGE_KERNEL
> +#endif
> +
> #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
>
> /* xwr */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
> index 4526245b03e5..f84351b4ac7c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
> #define _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
>
> #include <asm/pkeys_common.h>
> +#include <asm-generic/mman-common.h>
>
> #define ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY 0
>
> @@ -138,4 +139,14 @@ static inline int vma_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>
> u32 update_pkey_val(u32 pk_reg, int pkey, unsigned int flags);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
> +int pks_key_alloc(const char *const pkey_user, int flags);
> +void pks_key_free(int pkey);
> +
> +void pks_mk_noaccess(int pkey);
> +void pks_mk_readonly(int pkey);
> +void pks_mk_readwrite(int pkey);
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS */
> +
> #endif /*_ASM_X86_PKEYS_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h
> index 801a75615209..cd492c23b28c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h
> @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@
> PKR_AD_KEY(10) | PKR_AD_KEY(11) | PKR_AD_KEY(12) | \
> PKR_AD_KEY(13) | PKR_AD_KEY(14) | PKR_AD_KEY(15))
>
> +/* PKS supports 16 keys. Key 0 is reserved for the kernel. */
> +#define PKS_KERN_DEFAULT_KEY 0
> +#define PKS_NUM_KEYS 16
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
> void write_pkrs(u32 new_pkrs);
> #else
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
> index 76a62419c446..0dc77409957a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
> @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
> * Intel Memory Protection Keys management
> * Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation.
> */
> +#undef pr_fmt
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "x86/pkeys: " fmt
> +
> #include <linux/debugfs.h> /* debugfs_create_u32() */
> #include <linux/mm_types.h> /* mm_struct, vma, etc... */
> #include <linux/pkeys.h> /* PKEY_* */
> @@ -231,6 +234,7 @@ u32 update_pkey_val(u32 pk_reg, int pkey, unsigned int flags)
>
> return pk_reg;
> }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(update_pkey_val);
>
> DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, pkrs_cache);
>
> @@ -262,3 +266,125 @@ void write_pkrs(u32 new_pkrs)
> }
> put_cpu_ptr(pkrs);
> }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(write_pkrs);
> +
> +/**
> + * Do not call this directly, see pks_mk*() below.
> + *
> + * @pkey: Key for the domain to change
> + * @protection: protection bits to be used
> + *
> + * Protection utilizes the same protection bits specified for User pkeys
> + * PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
> + * PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
> + *
> + */
> +static inline void pks_update_protection(int pkey, unsigned long protection)
> +{
> + current->thread.saved_pkrs = update_pkey_val(current->thread.saved_pkrs,
> + pkey, protection);
> + write_pkrs(current->thread.saved_pkrs);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * PKS access control functions
> + *
> + * Change the access of the domain specified by the pkey. These are global
> + * updates. They only affects the current running thread. It is undefined and
> + * a bug for users to call this without having allocated a pkey and using it as
> + * pkey here.
> + *
> + * pks_mk_noaccess()
> + * Disable all access to the domain
> + * pks_mk_readonly()
> + * Make the domain Read only
> + * pks_mk_readwrite()
> + * Make the domain Read/Write
> + *
> + * @pkey the pkey for which the access should change.
> + *
> + */
> +void pks_mk_noaccess(int pkey)
> +{
> + pks_update_protection(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pks_mk_noaccess);
> +
> +void pks_mk_readonly(int pkey)
> +{
> + pks_update_protection(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pks_mk_readonly);
> +
> +void pks_mk_readwrite(int pkey)
> +{
> + pks_update_protection(pkey, 0);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pks_mk_readwrite);
> +
> +static const char pks_key_user0[] = "kernel";
> +
> +/* Store names of allocated keys for debug. Key 0 is reserved for the kernel. */
> +static const char *pks_key_users[PKS_NUM_KEYS] = {
> + pks_key_user0
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Each key is represented by a bit. Bit 0 is set for key 0 and reserved for
> + * its use. We use ulong for the bit operations but only 16 bits are used.
> + */
> +static unsigned long pks_key_allocation_map = 1 << PKS_KERN_DEFAULT_KEY;
> +
> +/*
> + * pks_key_alloc - Allocate a PKS key
> + * @pkey_user: String stored for debugging of key exhaustion. The caller is
> + * responsible to maintain this memory until pks_key_free().
> + * @flags: Flags to modify behavior: see pks_alloc_flags
> + *
> + * Returns: pkey if success
> + * -EOPNOTSUPP if pks is not supported or not enabled
> + * -ENOSPC if no keys are available (even for sharing)
> + */
> +int pks_key_alloc(const char * const pkey_user, int flags)
> +{
> + int nr;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKS))
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + while (1) {
> + nr = find_first_zero_bit(&pks_key_allocation_map, PKS_NUM_KEYS);
> + if (nr >= PKS_NUM_KEYS) {
> + pr_info("Cannot allocate supervisor key for %s.\n",
> + pkey_user);
> + return -ENOSPC;
> + }
> + if (!test_and_set_bit_lock(nr, &pks_key_allocation_map))
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + /* for debugging key exhaustion */
> + pks_key_users[nr] = pkey_user;
> +
> + return nr;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pks_key_alloc);
> +
> +/*
> + * pks_key_free - Free a previously allocate PKS key
> + * @pkey: Key to be free'ed
> + */
> +void pks_key_free(int pkey)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKS))
> + return;
> +
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pkey >= PKS_NUM_KEYS || pkey <= PKS_KERN_DEFAULT_KEY))
> + return;
> +
> + /* Restore to default of no access */
> + pks_mk_noaccess(pkey);
> + pks_key_users[pkey] = NULL;
> + __clear_bit(pkey, &pks_key_allocation_map);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pks_key_free);
> diff --git a/include/linux/pgtable.h b/include/linux/pgtable.h
> index 38c33eabea89..cd72d73e8e1c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/pgtable.h
> +++ b/include/linux/pgtable.h
> @@ -1402,6 +1402,10 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
> # define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC PAGE_KERNEL
> #endif
>
> +#ifndef PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY
> +#define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey) PAGE_KERNEL
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Page Table Modification bits for pgtbl_mod_mask.
> *
> diff --git a/include/linux/pkeys.h b/include/linux/pkeys.h
> index 2955ba976048..0959a4c0ca64 100644
> --- a/include/linux/pkeys.h
> +++ b/include/linux/pkeys.h
> @@ -50,4 +50,28 @@ static inline void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void)
>
> #endif /* ! CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
>
> +#define PKS_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE 0x00
> +
> +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
> +static inline int pks_key_alloc(const char * const pkey_user, int flags)
> +{
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> +static inline void pks_key_free(int pkey)
> +{
> +}
> +static inline void pks_mk_noaccess(int pkey)
> +{
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
So for panic-on-warn systems, this is ok to reboot the box?
Are you sure, that feels odd...
greg k-h
