Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] KVM: x86: Introduce allow list for MSR emulation

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On 20.08.20 00:49, Jim Mattson wrote:

On Mon, Aug 3, 2020 at 2:14 PM Alexander Graf <graf@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -901,6 +901,13 @@ struct kvm_hv {
         struct kvm_hv_syndbg hv_syndbg;
  };

+struct msr_bitmap_range {
+       u32 flags;
+       u32 nmsrs;
+       u32 base;
+       unsigned long *bitmap;
+};
+
  enum kvm_irqchip_mode {
         KVM_IRQCHIP_NONE,
         KVM_IRQCHIP_KERNEL,       /* created with KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP */
@@ -1005,6 +1012,9 @@ struct kvm_arch {
         /* Deflect RDMSR and WRMSR to user space when they trigger a #GP */
         bool user_space_msr_enabled;

+       struct msr_bitmap_range msr_allowlist_ranges[10];

Why 10? I think this is the only use of this constant, but a macro
would still be nice, especially since the number appears to be
arbitrary.

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 0780f97c1850..c33fb1d72d52 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -192,6 +192,21 @@ struct kvm_msr_list {
         __u32 indices[0];
  };

+#define KVM_MSR_ALLOW_READ  (1 << 0)
+#define KVM_MSR_ALLOW_WRITE (1 << 1)
+
+/* Maximum size of the of the bitmap in bytes */
+#define KVM_MSR_ALLOWLIST_MAX_LEN 0x600

Wouldn't 0x400 be a more natural size, since both Intel and AMD MSR
permission bitmaps cover ranges of 8192 MSRs?

You can always make your bitmaps 0x400 :). I had to choose something that limits our memory footprint, so that user space can't allocate infinite amounts of memory.


diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index e1139124350f..25e58ceb19de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1472,6 +1472,38 @@ void kvm_enable_efer_bits(u64 mask)
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_enable_efer_bits);

+static bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type)

In another thread, when I suggested that a function should return
bool, you said, "'I'm not a big fan of bool returning APIs unless they
have an "is" in their name.' This function doesn't have "is" in its
name. :-)

I've left this unanswered for way too long :). IMHO, passive is fine too, as it implies an "is" in my brain. Or to put it differently:

  bad: bool kvm_get_msr()
  bad: bool kvm_get_msr_user_space()
  good: bool kvm_msr_blocked()
  good: bool kvm_msr_allowed()
  good: bool is_kvm_msr_allowed()


+{
+       struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+       struct msr_bitmap_range *ranges = kvm->arch.msr_allowlist_ranges;
+       u32 count = kvm->arch.msr_allowlist_ranges_count;

Shouldn't the read of kvm->arch.msr_allowlist_ranges_count be guarded
by the mutex, below?

+       u32 i;
+       bool r = false;
+
+       /* MSR allowlist not set up, allow everything */
+       if (!count)
+               return true;
+
+       /* Prevent collision with clear_msr_allowlist */
+       mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+       for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+               u32 start = ranges[i].base;
+               u32 end = start + ranges[i].nmsrs;
+               u32 flags = ranges[i].flags;
+               unsigned long *bitmap = ranges[i].bitmap;
+
+               if ((index >= start) && (index < end) && (flags & type)) {
+                       r = !!test_bit(index - start, bitmap);

The !! seems gratuitous, since r is of type bool.

@@ -1483,6 +1515,9 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
  {
         struct msr_data msr;

+       if (!host_initiated && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_ALLOW_WRITE))
+               return -ENOENT;

Perhaps -EPERM is more appropriate here?

         switch (index) {
         case MSR_FS_BASE:
         case MSR_GS_BASE:
@@ -1528,6 +1563,9 @@ int __kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data,
         struct msr_data msr;
         int ret;

+       if (!host_initiated && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_ALLOW_READ))
+               return -ENOENT;

...and here?

+static bool msr_range_overlaps(struct kvm *kvm, struct msr_bitmap_range *range)

Another bool function with no "is"? :-)

+{
+       struct msr_bitmap_range *ranges = kvm->arch.msr_allowlist_ranges;
+       u32 i, count = kvm->arch.msr_allowlist_ranges_count;
+       bool r = false;
+
+       for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+               u32 start = max(range->base, ranges[i].base);
+               u32 end = min(range->base + range->nmsrs,
+                             ranges[i].base + ranges[i].nmsrs);
+
+               if ((start < end) && (range->flags & ranges[i].flags)) {
+                       r = true;
+                       break;
+               }
+       }
+
+       return r;
+}

This seems like an awkward constraint. Would it be possible to allow
overlapping ranges as long as the access types don't clash? So, for
example, could I specify an allow list for READ of MSRs 0-0x1ffff and
an allow list for WRITE of MSRs 0-0x1ffff? Actually, I don't see why
you have to prohibit overlapping ranges at all.

I tend to agree. Now that the order is obvious through the new API, we no longer need to check for overlaps.



+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_clear_msr_allowlist(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+       int i;

Nit: In earlier code, you use u32 for this index. (I'm actually a fan
of int, myself.)

I usually use int as well because it's easier to type, but doing signed indexes is just so wrong on so many levels :). I'll fix them up too be all u32.


Alex



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