On (20/06/23 13:07), Alan Maguire wrote:
> struct sk_buff *skb = alloc_skb(64, GFP_KERNEL);
>
> pr_info("%pT", BTF_PTR_TYPE(skb, "struct sk_buff"));
>
> ...gives us:
>
> (struct sk_buff){
> .transport_header = (__u16)65535,
> .mac_header = (__u16)65535,
> .end = (sk_buff_data_t)192,
> .head = (unsigned char *)000000007524fd8b,
> .data = (unsigned char *)000000007524fd8b,
> .truesize = (unsigned int)768,
> .users = (refcount_t){
> .refs = (atomic_t){
> .counter = (int)1,
> },
> },
> }
Hmm. So this can expose the kernel memory layout (IOW do you print out real
%px pointers and so on)? If so, then I'd suggest not to use printk.
Unprivileged /dev/kmsg or /proc/kmsg reads are really OK thing for printk()
log buffer. And if you are going to print pointer hashes instead,
.transport_header = (__u16)65535,
.mac_header = (__u16)65535,
.end = (sk_buff_data_t)192,
.head = (unsigned char *)34897918740, // pointer_hash
.data = (unsigned char *)23942384983, // pointer hash
.truesize = (unsigned int)768,
.users = (refcount_t){
.refs = (atomic_t){
.counter = (int)1,
},
},
then the value of such printouts becomes a bit unclear to me, sorry.
Probably, something like a seq print into a file somewhere in
/sys/kernel/debug/foo, from which only privileged processes can
read, would be a better approach? My 5 cents.
-ss
