On Thu, 2020-05-14 at 16:53 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: > On Thu, 14 May 2020 at 05:55, Jarkko Sakkinen > <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Wed, 2020-05-06 at 15:10 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: > > > Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as > > > an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations > > > like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusked keys > > > support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device. > > > > > > So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying > > > implemtations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in. > > > > > > Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > I tend to agree how this is implemented and could merge it as such. > > > > I'm just thinking if we could refine this patch in a way that instead of > > copying TRUSTED_DEBUG macro we could just replace pr_info() statements > > with pr_debug()? > > AFAIU, TRUSTED_DEBUG being a security sensitive operation is only > meant to be used in development environments and should be strictly > disabled in production environments. But it may not always be true > with pr_debug() with CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y which allows the debug > paths to be compiled into the kernel which can be enabled/disabled at > runtime. > > IMO we should keep this TRUSTED_DEBUG macro, so that users are aware > of its security sensitive nature and need to explicitly enable it to > debug. You are absolutely correct. /Jarkko
