On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 08:47:19AM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote: > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 10:25:58PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote: > > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:06:06PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote: > > > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 08:33:40PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote: > > > > I *think* that a cmdline route to enable this would likely remove the > > > > need for the kernel config for this. But even with Vlastimil's work > > > > merged, I think we'd want yet-another value to enable / disable this > > > > feature. Do we need yet-another-taint flag to tell us that this feature > > > > was enabled? > > > > > > > > > > I guess it makes sense to get rid of the sysctl interface for > > > proc_on_taint, and only keep it as a cmdline option. > > > > That would be easier to support and k3eps this simple. > > > > > But the real issue seems to be, regardless we go with a cmdline-only option > > > or not, the ability of proc_taint() to set any arbitrary taint flag > > > other than just marking the kernel with TAINT_USER. > > > > I think we would have no other option but to add a new TAINT flag so > > that we know that the taint flag was modified by a user. Perhaps just > > re-using TAINT_USER when proc_taint() would suffice. > > > > We might not need an extra taint flag if, perhaps, we could make these > two features mutually exclusive. The idea here is that bitmasks added > via panic_on_taint get filtered out in proc_taint(), so a malicious > user couldn't exploit the latter interface to easily panic the system, > when the first one is also in use. I get it, however I I can still see the person who enables enabling panic-on-tain wanting to know if proc_taint() was used. So even if it was not on their mask, if it was modified that seems like important information for a bug report analysis. Luis
