On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:50:46PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote: > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote: > > Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be > > as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode) > > case where no single taint is allowed for the running system. > > If used for this purpose then we must add a new TAINT flag for > proc_taint() was used, otherwise we can cheat to show a taint > *did* happen, where in fact it never happened, some punk just > echo'd a value into the kernel's /proc/sys/kernel/tainted. > To accomplish that, the punk would need to be root, though, in which case everything else is doomed, already. > Forunately proc_taint() only allows to *increment* the taint, not > reduce. > > Luis >
