[PATCHv5] exec: Fix a deadlock in ptrace

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This fixes a deadlock in the tracer when tracing a multi-threaded
application that calls execve while more than one thread are running.

I observed that when running strace on the gcc test suite, it always
blocks after a while, when expect calls execve, because other threads
have to be terminated.  They send ptrace events, but the strace is no
longer able to respond, since it is blocked in vm_access.

The deadlock is always happening when strace needs to access the
tracees process mmap, while another thread in the tracee starts to
execve a child process, but that cannot continue until the
PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT is handled and the WIFEXITED event is received:

strace          D    0 30614  30584 0x00000000
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x3ce/0x6e0
schedule+0x5c/0xd0
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x20
__mutex_lock.isra.13+0x1ec/0x520
__mutex_lock_killable_slowpath+0x13/0x20
mutex_lock_killable+0x28/0x30
mm_access+0x27/0xa0
process_vm_rw_core.isra.3+0xff/0x550
process_vm_rw+0xdd/0xf0
__x64_sys_process_vm_readv+0x31/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x220
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

expect          D    0 31933  30876 0x80004003
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x3ce/0x6e0
schedule+0x5c/0xd0
flush_old_exec+0xc4/0x770
load_elf_binary+0x35a/0x16c0
search_binary_handler+0x97/0x1d0
__do_execve_file.isra.40+0x5d4/0x8a0
__x64_sys_execve+0x49/0x60
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x220
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The proposed solution is to take the cred_guard_mutex only
in a critical section at the beginning, and at the end of the
execve function, and let PTRACE_ATTACH fail with EAGAIN while
execve is not complete, but other functions like vm_access are
allowed to complete normally.

This changes the lifetime of the cred_guard_mutex lock to be:
	- during prepare_bprm_creds()
	- from flush_old_exec() through install_exec_creds()
Before, cred_guard_mutex was held from prepare_bprm_creds() through
install_exec_creds().

I also took the opportunity to improve the documentation
of prepare_creds, which is obviously out of sync.

Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 Documentation/security/credentials.rst    | 19 +++++----
 fs/exec.c                                 | 41 ++++++++++++++++---
 include/linux/binfmts.h                   |  6 ++-
 include/linux/sched/signal.h              |  2 +
 kernel/cred.c                             |  2 +-
 kernel/ptrace.c                           |  4 ++
 kernel/seccomp.c                          |  3 ++
 mm/process_vm_access.c                    |  2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/Makefile   |  4 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c

v2: adds a test case which passes when this patch is applied.
v3: fixes the issue without introducing a new mutex.
v4: fixes one comment and a formatting issue found by checkpatch.pl in the test case. 
v5: addresses review comments.

diff --git a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
index 282e79f..0988798 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
@@ -437,9 +437,14 @@ new set of credentials by calling::
 
 	struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
 
-this locks current->cred_replace_mutex and then allocates and constructs a
-duplicate of the current process's credentials, returning with the mutex still
-held if successful.  It returns NULL if not successful (out of memory).
+this allocates and constructs a duplicate of the current process's credentials.
+It returns NULL if not successful (out of memory).
+
+If called from __do_execve_file, the mutex current->signal->cred_guard_mutex
+is acquired before this function gets called, and released after setting
+current->signal->cred_locked_in_execve.  The same mutex is acquired later,
+while the credentials and the process mmap are actually changed, and
+current->signal->cred_locked_in_execve is reset again.
 
 The mutex prevents ``ptrace()`` from altering the ptrace state of a process
 while security checks on credentials construction and changing is taking place
@@ -466,9 +471,8 @@ by calling::
 
 This will alter various aspects of the credentials and the process, giving the
 LSM a chance to do likewise, then it will use ``rcu_assign_pointer()`` to
-actually commit the new credentials to ``current->cred``, it will release
-``current->cred_replace_mutex`` to allow ``ptrace()`` to take place, and it
-will notify the scheduler and others of the changes.
+actually commit the new credentials to ``current->cred``, and it will notify
+the scheduler and others of the changes.
 
 This function is guaranteed to return 0, so that it can be tail-called at the
 end of such functions as ``sys_setresuid()``.
@@ -486,8 +490,7 @@ invoked::
 
 	void abort_creds(struct cred *new);
 
-This releases the lock on ``current->cred_replace_mutex`` that
-``prepare_creds()`` got and then releases the new credentials.
+This releases the new credentials.
 
 
 A typical credentials alteration function would look something like this::
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 74d88da..5fc744e 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1266,6 +1266,12 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	if (retval)
 		goto out;
 
+	retval = mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	if (retval)
+		goto out;
+
+	bprm->called_flush_old_exec = 1;
+
 	/*
 	 * Must be called _before_ exec_mmap() as bprm->mm is
 	 * not visibile until then. This also enables the update
@@ -1398,29 +1404,51 @@ void finalize_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(finalize_exec);
 
 /*
- * Prepare credentials and lock ->cred_guard_mutex.
+ * Prepare credentials and set ->cred_locked_in_execve.
  * install_exec_creds() commits the new creds and drops the lock.
  * Or, if exec fails before, free_bprm() should release ->cred and
  * and unlock.
  */
 static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
 		return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
 
+	ret = -EAGAIN;
+	if (unlikely(current->signal->cred_locked_in_execve))
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
-	if (likely(bprm->cred))
-		return 0;
+	if (likely(bprm->cred)) {
+		current->signal->cred_locked_in_execve = true;
+		ret = 0;
+	}
 
+out:
 	mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
-	return -ENOMEM;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	free_arg_pages(bprm);
 	if (bprm->cred) {
-		mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+		/*
+		 * If flush_old_exec did not acquire the cred_guard_mutex,
+		 * try again here, but if that fails, just leave
+		 * cred_locked_in_execve alone, since this means there
+		 * must be a fatal signal pending.
+		 * We don't want to prevent this task to be killed, just
+		 * because it is stuck in the middle of execve.
+		 */
+		if (bprm->called_flush_old_exec ||
+		    !mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) {
+			current->signal->cred_locked_in_execve = false;
+			mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+		}
 		abort_creds(bprm->cred);
 	}
 	if (bprm->file) {
@@ -1469,13 +1497,14 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
 	 */
 	security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
+	current->signal->cred_locked_in_execve = false;
 	mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
 
 /*
  * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
- * - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
+ * - the caller must have set ->cred_locked_in_execve to protect against
  *   PTRACE_ATTACH or seccomp thread-sync
  */
 static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index b40fc63..2930253 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -44,7 +44,11 @@ struct linux_binprm {
 		 * exec has happened. Used to sanitize execution environment
 		 * and to set AT_SECURE auxv for glibc.
 		 */
-		secureexec:1;
+		secureexec:1,
+		/*
+		 * Set by flush_old_exec, when the cred_guard_mutex is taken.
+		 */
+		called_flush_old_exec:1;
 #ifdef __alpha__
 	unsigned int taso:1;
 #endif
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
index 8805025..8f8e358 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
@@ -225,6 +225,8 @@ struct signal_struct {
 	struct mutex cred_guard_mutex;	/* guard against foreign influences on
 					 * credential calculations
 					 * (notably. ptrace) */
+	bool cred_locked_in_execve;	/* set while in execve, only valid when
+					 * cred_guard_mutex is held */
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 /*
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 809a985..e4c78de 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
  *
  * Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
  *
- * Does not take, and does not return holding current->cred_replace_mutex.
+ * Does not take, and does not return holding ->cred_guard_mutex.
  */
 struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 43d6179..0f82bab 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -395,6 +395,10 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
 	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
 		goto out;
 
+	retval = -EAGAIN;
+	if (task->signal->cred_locked_in_execve)
+		goto unlock_creds;
+
 	task_lock(task);
 	retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
 	task_unlock(task);
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index b6ea3dc..3efa3e5 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
 	BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
 	assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
 
+	if (current->signal->cred_locked_in_execve)
+		return -EAGAIN;
+
 	/* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */
 	caller = current;
 	for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
diff --git a/mm/process_vm_access.c b/mm/process_vm_access.c
index 357aa7b..b3e6eb5 100644
--- a/mm/process_vm_access.c
+++ b/mm/process_vm_access.c
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static ssize_t process_vm_rw_core(pid_t pid, struct iov_iter *iter,
 	if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm)) {
 		rc = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;
 		/*
-		 * Explicitly map EACCES to EPERM as EPERM is a more a
+		 * Explicitly map EACCES to EPERM as EPERM is a more
 		 * appropriate error code for process_vw_readv/writev
 		 */
 		if (rc == -EACCES)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/Makefile
index c0b7f89..2f1f532 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
-CFLAGS += -iquote../../../../include/uapi -Wall
+CFLAGS += -std=c99 -pthread -iquote../../../../include/uapi -Wall
 
-TEST_GEN_PROGS := get_syscall_info peeksiginfo
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := get_syscall_info peeksiginfo vmaccess
 
 include ../lib.mk
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d8a048
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Check whether /proc/$pid/mem can be accessed without causing deadlocks
+ * when de_thread is blocked with ->cred_guard_mutex held.
+ */
+
+#include "../kselftest_harness.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+
+static void *thread(void *arg)
+{
+	ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, 0L, 0L);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+TEST(vmaccess)
+{
+	int f, pid = fork();
+	char mm[64];
+
+	if (!pid) {
+		pthread_t pt;
+
+		pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread, NULL);
+		pthread_join(pt, NULL);
+		execlp("true", "true", NULL);
+	}
+
+	sleep(1);
+	sprintf(mm, "/proc/%d/mem", pid);
+	f = open(mm, O_RDONLY);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, f);
+	close(f);
+	f = kill(pid, SIGCONT);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, f);
+}
+
+TEST(attach)
+{
+	int f, pid = fork();
+
+	if (!pid) {
+		pthread_t pt;
+
+		pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread, NULL);
+		pthread_join(pt, NULL);
+		execlp("true", "true", NULL);
+	}
+
+	sleep(1);
+	f = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L);
+	ASSERT_EQ(EAGAIN, errno);
+	ASSERT_EQ(f, -1);
+	f = kill(pid, SIGCONT);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, f);
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
-- 
1.9.1




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