On 10/23/19 6:23 PM, Michal Suchánek wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 23, 2019 at 04:13:15PM +0200, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
>> On 10/23/19 2:52 PM, Michal Suchanek wrote:
>>> The WMware ESXi cdrom identifies itself as:
>>> sr 0:0:0:0: [sr0] scsi3-mmc drive: vendor: "NECVMWarVMware SATA CD001.00"
>>> model: "VMware SATA CD001.00"
>>> with the following get_capabilities print in sr.c:
>>> sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
>>> "scsi3-mmc drive: vendor: \"%s\" model: \"%s\"\n",
>>> cd->device->vendor, cd->device->model);
>>>
>>> So the model looks like reliable identification while vendor does not.
>>>
>>> The drive claims to have a tray and claims to be able to close it.
>>> However, the UI has no notion of a tray - when medium is ejected it is
>>> dropped in the floor and the user must select a medium again before the
>>> drive can be re-loaded. On the kernel side the tray_move call to close
>>> the tray succeeds but the drive state does not change as a result of the
>>> call.
>>>
>>> The drive does not in fact emulate the tray state. There are two ways to
>>> get the medium state. One is the SCSI status:
>>>
>>> Physical drive:
>>>
>>> Fixed format, current; Sense key: Not Ready
>>> Additional sense: Medium not present - tray open
>>> Raw sense data (in hex):
>>> 70 00 02 00 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 00 3a 02 00 00
>>> 00 00
>>>
>>> Fixed format, current; Sense key: Not Ready
>>> Additional sense: Medium not present - tray closed
>>> Raw sense data (in hex):
>>> 70 00 02 00 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 00 3a 01 00 00
>>> 00 00
>>>
>>> VMware ESXi:
>>>
>>> Fixed format, current; Sense key: Not Ready
>>> Additional sense: Medium not present
>>> Info fld=0x0 [0]
>>> Raw sense data (in hex):
>>> f0 00 02 00 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 00 3a 00 00 00
>>> 00 00
>>>
>>> So the tray state is not reported here. Other is medium status which the
>>> kernel prefers if available. Adding a print here gives:
>>>
>>> cdrom: get_media_event success: code = 0, door_open = 1, medium_present = 0
>>>
>>> door_open is interpreted as open tray. This is fine so long as tray_move
>>> would close the tray when requested or report an error which never
>>> happens on VMware ESXi servers (5.5 and 6.5 tested).
>>>
>>> This is a popular virtualization platform so a workaround is worthwhile.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>> drivers/scsi/sr.c | 6 ++++++
>>> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sr.c b/drivers/scsi/sr.c
>>> index 4664fdf75c0f..8090c5bdec09 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/scsi/sr.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/scsi/sr.c
>>> @@ -867,6 +867,7 @@ static void get_capabilities(struct scsi_cd *cd)
>>> unsigned int ms_len = 128;
>>> int rc, n;
>>>
>>> + static const char *model_vmware = "VMware";
>>> static const char *loadmech[] =
>>> {
>>> "caddy",
>>> @@ -922,6 +923,11 @@ static void get_capabilities(struct scsi_cd *cd)
>>> buffer[n + 4] & 0x20 ? "xa/form2 " : "", /* can read xa/from2 */
>>> buffer[n + 5] & 0x01 ? "cdda " : "", /* can read audio data */
>>> loadmech[buffer[n + 6] >> 5]);
>>> + if (!strncmp(cd->device->model, model_vmware, strlen(model_vmware))) {
>>> + buffer[n + 6] &= ~(0xff << 5);
>>> + sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
>>> + "VMware ESXi bug workaround: tray -> caddy\n");
>>> + }
>>> if ((buffer[n + 6] >> 5) == 0)
>>> /* caddy drives can't close tray... */
>>> cd->cdi.mask |= CDC_CLOSE_TRAY;
>>>
>> This looks something which should be handled via a blacklist flag, not
>> some inline hack which everyone forgets about it...
>
> AFAIK we used to have a blacklist but don't have anymore. So either it
> has to be resurrected for this one flag or an inline hack should be good
> enough.
>
But we do have one for generic scsi; cf drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c.
And this pretty much falls into the category of SCSI quirks, so I'd
prefer have it hooked into that.
Cheers,
Hannes
--
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Teamlead Storage & Networking
hare@xxxxxxx +49 911 74053 688
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg
HRB 247165 (AG München), GF: Felix Imendörffer
