Identify the example blocks there, in order to avoid Sphinx
warnings.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/other/speculation.rst | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/other/speculation.rst b/Documentation/other/speculation.rst
index e9e6cbae2841..50d7ea857cff 100644
--- a/Documentation/other/speculation.rst
+++ b/Documentation/other/speculation.rst
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ observed to extract secret information.
For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds
checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the
-following code:
+following code::
int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)
{
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ following code:
return array[index];
}
-Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as:
+Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as::
CMP <index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS
B.LT less
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured.
More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may
result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following
-code, building on the prior example:
+code, building on the prior example::
int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index)
{
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index
value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation
conditions.
-This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example:
+This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example::
int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)
{
--
2.20.1
