For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the documentation reflects that. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx> Cc: linux-doc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index b799bcf67d7b..9475f02c79da 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1982,6 +1982,12 @@ Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y, the default is off. + kpti= [ARM64] Control page table isolation of user + and kernel address spaces. + Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation. + 0: force disabled + 1: force enabled + kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs. Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP) -- 2.17.2
