On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 7:41 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Look in .note.gnu.property of an ELF file and check if shadow stack needs > to be enabled for the task. Nice! But please structure it so it's one function that parses out all the ELF notes and some other code (a table or a switch statement) that handles them. We will probably want to add more kernel-parsed ELF notes some day, so let's structure the code to make it easier. > +static int find_cet(u8 *buf, u32 size, u32 align, int *shstk, int *ibt) > +{ > + unsigned long start = (unsigned long)buf; > + struct elf_note *note = (struct elf_note *)buf; > + > + *shstk = 0; > + *ibt = 0; > + > + /* > + * Go through the x86_note_gnu_property array pointed by > + * buf and look for shadow stack and indirect branch > + * tracking features. > + * The GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND entry contains only > + * one u32 as data. Do not go beyond buf_size. > + */ > + > + while ((unsigned long) (note + 1) - start < size) { > + /* Find the NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 note. */ > + if (note->n_namesz == 4 && > + note->n_type == NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 && > + memcmp(note + 1, "GNU", 4) == 0) { > + u8 *ptr, *ptr_end; > + > + /* Check for invalid property. */ > + if (note->n_descsz < 8 || > + (note->n_descsz % align) != 0) > + return 0; > + > + /* Start and end of property array. */ > + ptr = (u8 *)(note + 1) + 4; > + ptr_end = ptr + note->n_descsz; Exploitable bug here? You haven't checked that ptr is in bounds or that ptr + ptr_end is in bounds (or that ptr_end > ptr, for that matter). > + > + while (1) { > + u32 type = *(u32 *)ptr; > + u32 datasz = *(u32 *)(ptr + 4); > + > + ptr += 8; > + if ((ptr + datasz) > ptr_end) > + break; > + > + if (type == GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND && > + datasz == 4) { > + u32 p = *(u32 *)ptr; > + > + if (p & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK) > + *shstk = 1; > + if (p & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT) > + *ibt = 1; > + return 1; > + } > + } > + } > + > + /* > + * Note sections like .note.ABI-tag and .note.gnu.build-id > + * are aligned to 4 bytes in 64-bit ELF objects. > + */ > + note = (void *)note + ELF_NOTE_NEXT_OFFSET(note, align); A malicious value here will probably just break out of the while statement, but it's still scary. > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int check_pt_note_segment(struct file *file, > + unsigned long note_size, loff_t *pos, > + u32 align, int *shstk, int *ibt) > +{ > + int retval; > + char *note_buf; > + > + /* > + * Try to read in the whole PT_NOTE segment. > + */ > + note_buf = kmalloc(note_size, GFP_KERNEL); kmalloc() with fully user-controlled, unchecked size is not a good idea. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html