On 9/6/2017 6:32 PM, Pavel Machek wrote: > On Tue 2017-09-05 14:44:56, David Miller wrote: >> From: Pavel Machek <pavel@xxxxxx> >> Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 18:25:30 +0200 >> >>> Will gcc be able to compile code that uses these automatically? That >>> does not sound easy to me. Can libc automatically use this in malloc() >>> to prevent accessing freed data when buffers are overrun? >>> >>> Is this for benefit of JITs? >> >> Anything that can control mappings and the virtual address used to >> access memory can use ADI. >> >> malloc() is of course one such case. It can map memory with ADI >> enabled, and return buffer addresses to malloc() callers with the >> proper virtual address bits set to satisfy the ADI key checks. >> >> And by induction anything using malloc() for it's memory allocation >> gets ADI protection as well. > > I see; that's actually quite a nice trick. > > I guess it does not protect against stack-based overflows, but should > help against heap-based overflows, so it improves security a bit, too. > > Nice, thanks for explanation. ADI can also be used to protect the stack. Modify ADI versions for a 64B aligned portion of the register save area in the kernel spill and fill handlers, and accidental or malicious access to the area from userland will trap. Other data on the stack can be corrupted, but one cannot linearly overflow into the next stack frame without tripping over the ADI canary. There are a few other details to handle, such as setjmp/longjmp and JITs that modify the stack, but that is the gist. This is not part of the current patch, but has been implemented on Solaris. ADI could protect other data on the stack, but that requires compiler code generation changes. - Steve -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
