On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 09:44:11PM +0800, Anand Jain wrote: > > > >+fscrypt is not guaranteed to protect confidentiality or authenticity > >+if an attacker is able to manipulate the filesystem offline prior to > >+an authorized user later accessing the filesystem. > > How does fscrypt / Android protect against Evil Maid attack. ? > > Thanks, Anand As Ted mentioned, it really depends on the type of attack. If we assume that the attacker can *only* change the contents of disk, then there is a protection against a specific type of attack. Android has Verified Boot, which verifies the integrity and authenticity of the kernel and the 'system' partition: https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/ >From there, the vold binary (which has been authenticated using dm-verity) is able to unwrap the encryption keys (which are authenticated using AES-GCM), then check that the encrypted directories have the correct encryption policies. The filesystem then enforces the one-policy-per-tree constraint, as described in my proposed documentation: Except for those special files, it is forbidden to have unencrypted files, or files encrypted with a different encryption policy, in an encrypted directory tree. Attempts to link or rename such a file into an encrypted directory will fail with EPERM. This is also enforced during ->lookup() to provide limited protection against offline attacks that try to disable or downgrade encryption in known locations where applications may later write sensitive data. So on Android, an "Evil Maid" attacker cannot simply replace an encrypted directory with an unencrypted one, causing a program to write unencrypted files to that directory. _However_, an "Evil Maid" attacker can probably still do other, perhaps much more effective attacks --- e.g. installing a hardware "key logger", or perhaps installing a binary into /data in such a way that it gets auto-executed and compromises the system after the user logs in. Or they could attack the actual file contents encryption which is not authenticated. Or they could mess around with filesystem metadata on the userdata partition, which is neither encrypted nor authenticated. I suppose that dm-integrity could be used to protect against some of those attacks, but of course it would not protect against hardware key loggers, etc. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
