Re: [PACTH v4 1/3] mm, proc: Implement /proc/<pid>/totmaps

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Hi Robert,

On 08/17/2016 12:33 AM, robert.foss@xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
From: Robert Foss <robert.foss@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

This is based on earlier work by Thiago Goncales. It implements a new
per process proc file which summarizes the contents of the smaps file
but doesn't display any addresses.  It gives more detailed information
than statm like the PSS (proprotional set size).  It differs from the
original implementation in that it doesn't use the full blown set of
seq operations, uses a different termination condition, and doesn't
displayed "Locked" as that was broken on the original implemenation.

This new proc file provides information faster than parsing the potentially
huge smaps file.

Tested-by: Robert Foss <robert.foss@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Robert Foss <robert.foss@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Signed-off-by: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 fs/proc/base.c     |   1 +
 fs/proc/internal.h |   2 +
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 141 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 144 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index a11eb71..de3acdf 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2855,6 +2855,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
 	REG("clear_refs", S_IWUSR, proc_clear_refs_operations),
 	REG("smaps",      S_IRUGO, proc_pid_smaps_operations),
 	REG("pagemap",    S_IRUSR, proc_pagemap_operations),
+	REG("totmaps",    S_IRUGO, proc_totmaps_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 	DIR("attr",       S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_attr_dir_inode_operations, proc_attr_dir_operations),
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index aa27810..99f97d7 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ extern const struct file_operations proc_pid_smaps_operations;
 extern const struct file_operations proc_tid_smaps_operations;
 extern const struct file_operations proc_clear_refs_operations;
 extern const struct file_operations proc_pagemap_operations;
+extern const struct file_operations proc_totmaps_operations;
+

 extern unsigned long task_vsize(struct mm_struct *);
 extern unsigned long task_statm(struct mm_struct *,
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index 4648c7f..fd8fd7f 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -802,6 +802,75 @@ static int show_smap(struct seq_file *m, void *v, int is_pid)
 	return 0;
 }

+static void add_smaps_sum(struct mem_size_stats *mss,
+		struct mem_size_stats *mss_sum)
+{
+	mss_sum->resident += mss->resident;
+	mss_sum->pss += mss->pss;
+	mss_sum->shared_clean += mss->shared_clean;
+	mss_sum->shared_dirty += mss->shared_dirty;
+	mss_sum->private_clean += mss->private_clean;
+	mss_sum->private_dirty += mss->private_dirty;
+	mss_sum->referenced += mss->referenced;
+	mss_sum->anonymous += mss->anonymous;
+	mss_sum->anonymous_thp += mss->anonymous_thp;
+	mss_sum->swap += mss->swap;
+}
+
+static int totmaps_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
+{
+	struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = priv->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	struct mem_size_stats mss_sum;
+
+	memset(&mss_sum, 0, sizeof(mss_sum));
+	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	hold_task_mempolicy(priv);
+
+	for (vma = mm->mmap; vma != priv->tail_vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+		struct mem_size_stats mss;
+		struct mm_walk smaps_walk = {
+			.pmd_entry = smaps_pte_range,
+			.mm = vma->vm_mm,
+			.private = &mss,
+		};
+
+		if (vma->vm_mm && !is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
+			memset(&mss, 0, sizeof(mss));
+			walk_page_vma(vma, &smaps_walk);
+			add_smaps_sum(&mss, &mss_sum);
+		}
+	}
+
+	release_task_mempolicy(priv);
+	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+	seq_printf(m,
+		   "Rss:            %8lu kB\n"
+		   "Pss:            %8lu kB\n"
+		   "Shared_Clean:   %8lu kB\n"
+		   "Shared_Dirty:   %8lu kB\n"
+		   "Private_Clean:  %8lu kB\n"
+		   "Private_Dirty:  %8lu kB\n"
+		   "Referenced:     %8lu kB\n"
+		   "Anonymous:      %8lu kB\n"
+		   "AnonHugePages:  %8lu kB\n"
+		   "Swap:           %8lu kB\n",
+		   mss_sum.resident >> 10,
+		   (unsigned long)(mss_sum.pss >> (10 + PSS_SHIFT)),
+		   mss_sum.shared_clean  >> 10,
+		   mss_sum.shared_dirty  >> 10,
+		   mss_sum.private_clean >> 10,
+		   mss_sum.private_dirty >> 10,
+		   mss_sum.referenced >> 10,
+		   mss_sum.anonymous >> 10,
+		   mss_sum.anonymous_thp >> 10,
+		   mss_sum.swap >> 10);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int show_pid_smap(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 	return show_smap(m, v, 1);
@@ -812,6 +881,28 @@ static int show_tid_smap(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	return show_smap(m, v, 0);
 }

+static void *m_totmaps_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return NULL + (*pos == 0);
+}
+
+static void *m_totmaps_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	++*pos;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void m_totmaps_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
+{
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations proc_totmaps_op = {
+	.start	= m_totmaps_start,
+	.next	= m_totmaps_next,
+	.stop	= m_totmaps_stop,
+	.show	= totmaps_proc_show
+};
+
 static const struct seq_operations proc_pid_smaps_op = {
 	.start	= m_start,
 	.next	= m_next,
@@ -836,6 +927,49 @@ static int tid_smaps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	return do_maps_open(inode, file, &proc_tid_smaps_op);
 }

+static int totmaps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct proc_maps_private *priv = NULL;
+	struct seq_file *seq;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = do_maps_open(inode, file, &proc_totmaps_op);
+	if (ret)
+		goto error;
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to grab references to the task_struct
+	 * at open time, because there's a potential information
+	 * leak where the totmaps file is opened and held open
+	 * while the underlying pid to task mapping changes
+	 * underneath it
+	 */
+	seq = file->private_data;
+	priv = seq->private;
+	priv->task = get_proc_task(inode);
+	if (!priv->task) {
+		ret = -ESRCH;
+		goto error_free;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+error_free:
+	proc_map_release(inode, file);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int totmaps_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+	struct proc_maps_private *priv = seq->private;
+
+	put_task_struct(priv->task);
+
+	return proc_map_release(inode, file);
+}
+
 const struct file_operations proc_pid_smaps_operations = {
 	.open		= pid_smaps_open,
 	.read		= seq_read,
@@ -850,6 +984,13 @@ const struct file_operations proc_tid_smaps_operations = {
 	.release	= proc_map_release,
 };

+const struct file_operations proc_totmaps_operations = {
+	.open		= totmaps_open,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.release	= totmaps_release,
+};
+
 enum clear_refs_types {
 	CLEAR_REFS_ALL = 1,
 	CLEAR_REFS_ANON,


When reading totmaps of kernel processes the following NULL pointer
dereference occurs:

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000044
pgd = ee6e0000
[00000044] *pgd=7b83a831
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#6] PREEMPT SMP ARM
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 1495 Comm: cat Tainted: G D W 4.8.0-rc2-00010-g22fe2db-dirty #159
Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree)
task: ee596e00 task.stack: ee470000
PC is at down_read+0xc/0x48
LR is at totmaps_proc_show+0x2c/0x1e8
pc : [<c06c01f4>]    lr : [<c022a154>]    psr: 40000013
sp : ee471db8  ip : 00000000  fp : 00000000
r10: edfe1080  r9 : 00000001  r8 : 00000044
r7 : ee4abd00  r6 : edfe1080  r5 : edde0b80  r4 : 00000044
r3 : 00000000  r2 : 00000000  r1 : ffffffc8  r0 : 00000044
Flags: nZcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment none
Control: 10c5387d  Table: 6e6e004a  DAC: 00000051
Process cat (pid: 1495, stack limit = 0xee470210)
Stack: (0xee471db8 to 0xee472000)
1da0: 00000000 c022a154 1dc0: ee596e00 024200ca 00000000 024200ca 00000000 00000081 c0b02594 024200ca 1de0: 00000055 ee5b7e44 00000800 c019cad0 00000000 c06c1af0 00000001 c032aa90 1e00: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 1e20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 1e40: 00000000 00000000 c0a69764 c0a69758 0000000b c01afd60 eff4d000 eff4d000 1e60: edc55f20 00000000 edfe10b0 0001c000 20000013 c06bfc9c 7ab80c7f c01bc060 1e80: 00000002 ef001b80 c0a695d0 024000c0 00008000 ee471ec0 00008000 edfe1080 1ea0: ee4abd00 00000001 00000001 ee471f80 00000000 c01fe564 0001c000 edfe10b0 1ec0: 00000000 00000000 00024e84 ee5b7e00 ee5b7e44 c0705348 0001c000 ee4abd00 1ee0: ee471f80 00008000 ee470000 0001c000 00000000 c01dc850 c0b06aac ee471fb0 1f00: b6fbf220 b6fbf7c4 000001ff c0101308 386d6a0e 32e4d737 386d6a0e 32e4d737 1f20: 00002838 00000000 ee4abd00 bec0eba0 00000000 bec0ed84 ee596e00 00000000 1f40: ee4abd00 00008000 0001c000 00000000 ee471f80 c01ddca0 00000004 ee478124 1f60: 00000001 00000000 00000000 ee4abd00 ee4abd00 00008000 0001c000 c01ddd64 1f80: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00008000 0001c000 00000003 00000003 c0107ac4 1fa0: 00000000 c0107900 00008000 0001c000 00000003 0001c000 00008000 0001c000 1fc0: 00008000 0001c000 00000003 00000003 00008000 00000000 0000005e 00000000 1fe0: 00000000 bec0eb0c 0000c694 b6f4248c 60000010 00000003 fdfffffb ffffffff
[<c06c01f4>] (down_read) from [<c022a154>] (totmaps_proc_show+0x2c/0x1e8)
[<c022a154>] (totmaps_proc_show) from [<c01fe564>] (seq_read+0x1c8/0x4b8)
[<c01fe564>] (seq_read) from [<c01dc850>] (__vfs_read+0x2c/0x110)
[<c01dc850>] (__vfs_read) from [<c01ddca0>] (vfs_read+0x8c/0x110)
[<c01ddca0>] (vfs_read) from [<c01ddd64>] (SyS_read+0x40/0x8c)
[<c01ddd64>] (SyS_read) from [<c0107900>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x3c)

It seems that some protection is needed for such processes, so that
totmaps would return empty string then, like in case of smaps.

--
Best regards,
Jacek Anaszewski
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