On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 11:28:56AM +0200, Lukasz Pawelczyk wrote:
> On czw, 2015-07-30 at 16:30 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 12:04:35PM +0200, Lukasz Pawelczyk wrote:
> > > @@ -969,6 +982,7 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsproxy
> > > *nsproxy, struct ns_common *ns)
> > > {
> > > struct user_namespace *user_ns = to_user_ns(ns);
> > > struct cred *cred;
> > > + int err;
> > >
> > > /* Don't allow gaining capabilities by reentering
> > > * the same user namespace.
> > > @@ -986,6 +1000,10 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsproxy
> > > *nsproxy, struct ns_common *ns)
> > > if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > > return -EPERM;
> > >
> > > + err = security_userns_setns(nsproxy, user_ns);
> > > + if (err)
> > > + return err;
> >
> > So at this point the LSM thinks current is in the new ns. If
> > prepare_creds() fails below, should it be informed of that?
> > (Or am I over-thinking this?)
> >
> > > +
> > > cred = prepare_creds();
> > > if (!cred)
> > > return -ENOMEM;
>
> Hmm, the use case for this hook I had in mind was just to allow or
> disallow the operation based on the information passed in arguments.
> Not to register the current in any way so LSM can think it is or isn't
> in the new namespace.
>
> I think that any other LSM check that would like to know in what
> namespace the current is, would just check that from current's creds.
> Not use some stale and duplicated information the above hook could have
> registered.
>
> I see no reason for this hook to change the LSM state, only to answer
> the question: allowed/disallowed (eventually return an error cause it
> is unable to give an answer which falls into the disallow category).
How about renaming it "security_userns_may_setns()" for clarity?
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