On Sun, Feb 02, 2025 at 06:43:05PM -0600, Rob Herring (Arm) wrote:
[...]
> +void brbe_enable(const struct arm_pmu *arm_pmu)
> +{
> + struct pmu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(arm_pmu->hw_events);
> + u64 brbfcr = 0, brbcr = 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * Merge the permitted branch filters of all events.
> + */
> + for (int i = 0; i < ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS; i++) {
> + struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[i];
> +
> + if (event && has_branch_stack(event)) {
> + brbfcr |= event->hw.branch_reg.config;
> + brbcr |= event->hw.extra_reg.config;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * If the record buffer contains any branches, we've already read them
> + * out and don't want to read them again.
> + * No need to sync as we're already stopped.
> + */
> + brbe_invalidate_nosync();
> + isb(); // Make sure invalidate takes effect before enabling
> +
> + /*
> + * In VHE mode with MDCR_EL2.HPMN set to PMCR_EL0.N, the counters are
> + * controlled by BRBCR_EL1 rather than BRBCR_EL2 (which writes to
> + * BRBCR_EL1 are redirected to). Use the same value for both register
> + * except keep EL1 and EL0 recording disabled in guests.
> + */
> + if (is_kernel_in_hyp_mode())
> + write_sysreg_s(brbcr & ~(BRBCR_ELx_ExBRE | BRBCR_ELx_E0BRE), SYS_BRBCR_EL12);
> + write_sysreg_s(brbcr, SYS_BRBCR_EL1);
> + isb(); // Ensure BRBCR_ELx settings take effect before unpausing
> +
> + write_sysreg_s(brbfcr, SYS_BRBFCR_EL1);
Seems to me, it is weird that first enable recording (BRBCR), then set
control register BRBFCR. And the writing SYS_BRBFCR_EL1 not guarded
by a barrier is also a bit concerned.
> +}
> +
> +void brbe_disable(void)
> +{
> + /*
> + * No need for synchronization here as synchronization in PMCR write
> + * ensures ordering and in the interrupt handler this is a NOP as
> + * we're already paused.
> + */
> + write_sysreg_s(BRBFCR_EL1_PAUSED, SYS_BRBFCR_EL1);
Maybe the Arm ARM causes the confusion for the description of the
PAUSED bit, I read it as this bit is a status bit to indicate
branch recording is paused.
> +}
> +
> +static const int brbe_type_to_perf_type_map[BRBINFx_EL1_TYPE_DEBUG_EXIT + 1][2] = {
> + [BRBINFx_EL1_TYPE_DIRECT_UNCOND] = { PERF_BR_UNCOND, 0 },
> + [BRBINFx_EL1_TYPE_INDIRECT] = { PERF_BR_IND, 0 },
> + [BRBINFx_EL1_TYPE_DIRECT_LINK] = { PERF_BR_CALL, 0 },
> + [BRBINFx_EL1_TYPE_INDIRECT_LINK] = { PERF_BR_IND_CALL, 0 },
> + [BRBINFx_EL1_TYPE_RET] = { PERF_BR_RET, 0 },
> + [BRBINFx_EL1_TYPE_DIRECT_COND] = { PERF_BR_COND, 0 },
> + [BRBINFx_EL1_TYPE_CALL] = { PERF_BR_CALL, 0 },
> + [BRBINFx_EL1_TYPE_ERET] = { PERF_BR_ERET, 0 },
> + [BRBINFx_EL1_TYPE_IRQ] = { PERF_BR_IRQ, 0 },
I saw this table cannot reflect the complete branch type. We might
need to consider to extend the perf branch flags later.
If the 'new_type' is always zero, it is not necessary to maintain a
array with two items (the second one is always 0).
> +};
> +
> +static void brbe_set_perf_entry_type(struct perf_branch_entry *entry, u64 brbinf)
> +{
> + int brbe_type = brbinf_get_type(brbinf);
> +
> + if (brbe_type <= BRBINFx_EL1_TYPE_DEBUG_EXIT) {
> + const int *br_type = brbe_type_to_perf_type_map[brbe_type];
> +
> + entry->type = br_type[0];
> + entry->new_type = br_type[1];
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static int brbinf_get_perf_priv(u64 brbinf)
> +{
> + int brbe_el = brbinf_get_el(brbinf);
> +
> + switch (brbe_el) {
> + case BRBINFx_EL1_EL_EL0:
> + return PERF_BR_PRIV_USER;
> + case BRBINFx_EL1_EL_EL1:
> + return PERF_BR_PRIV_KERNEL;
> + case BRBINFx_EL1_EL_EL2:
> + if (is_kernel_in_hyp_mode())
> + return PERF_BR_PRIV_KERNEL;
> + return PERF_BR_PRIV_HV;
> + default:
> + pr_warn_once("%d - unknown branch privilege captured\n", brbe_el);
> + return PERF_BR_PRIV_UNKNOWN;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void capture_brbe_flags(struct perf_branch_entry *entry,
> + const struct perf_event *event,
> + u64 brbinf)
> +{
> + brbe_set_perf_entry_type(entry, brbinf);
> +
> + if (!branch_sample_no_cycles(event))
> + entry->cycles = brbinf_get_cycles(brbinf);
> +
> + if (!branch_sample_no_flags(event)) {
> + /* Mispredict info is available for source only and complete branch records. */
> + if (!brbe_record_is_target_only(brbinf)) {
> + entry->mispred = brbinf_get_mispredict(brbinf);
> + entry->predicted = !entry->mispred;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Currently TME feature is neither implemented in any hardware
> + * nor it is being supported in the kernel. Just warn here once
> + * if TME related information shows up rather unexpectedly.
> + */
> + if (brbinf_get_lastfailed(brbinf) || brbinf_get_in_tx(brbinf))
> + pr_warn_once("Unknown transaction states\n");
If the branch is in transaction, we can set:
entry->in_tx = 1;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Branch privilege level is available for target only and complete
> + * branch records.
> + */
> + if (!brbe_record_is_source_only(brbinf))
> + entry->priv = brbinf_get_perf_priv(brbinf);
This logic is not quite right. In theory, if we check with above
condition (!brbe_record_is_source_only(brbinf)), it might be the
case both source and target are not valid.
Thanks,
Leo
