Re: [PATCH V3] PCI: Extend ACS configurability

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On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 08:23:01PM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 04:29:03PM -0500, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> > [+cc Alex since VFIO entered the conversation; thread at
> > https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240523063528.199908-1-vidyas@xxxxxxxxxx]
> > 
> > On Mon, Jun 10, 2024 at 08:38:49AM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jun 07, 2024 at 02:30:55PM -0500, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> > > > "Correctly" is not quite the right word here; it's just a fact that
> > > > the ACS settings determined at boot time result in certain IOMMU
> > > > groups.  If the user desires different groups, it's not that something
> > > > is "incorrect"; it's just that the user may have to accept less
> > > > isolation to get the desired IOMMU groups.
> > > 
> > > That is not quite accurate.. There are HW configurations where ACS
> > > needs to be a certain way for the HW to work with P2P at all. It isn't
> > > just an optimization or the user accepts something, if they want P2P
> > > at all they must get a ACS configuration appropriate for their system.
> > 
> > The current wording of "For iommu_groups to form correctly, the ACS
> > settings in the PCIe fabric need to be setup early" suggests that the
> > way we currently configure ACS is incorrect in general, regardless of
> > P2PDMA.
> 
> Yes, I'd agree with this. We don't have enough information to
> configurate it properly in the kernel in an automatic way. We don't
> know if pairs of devices even have SW enablement to do P2P in the
> kernel and we don't accurately know what issues the root complex
> has. All of this information goes into choosing the right ACS bits.
> 
> > But my impression is that there's a trade-off between isolation and
> > the ability to do P2PDMA, and users have different requirements, and
> > the preference for less isolation/more P2PDMA is no more "correct"
> > than a preference for more isolation/less P2PDMA.
> 
> Sure, that makes sense
>  
> > Maybe something like this:
> > 
> >   PCIe ACS settings determine how devices are put into iommu_groups.
> >   The iommu_groups in turn determine which devices can be passed
> >   through to VMs and whether P2PDMA between them is possible.  The
> >   iommu_groups are built at enumeration-time and are currently static.
> 
> Not quite, the iommu_groups don't have alot to do with the P2P. Even
> devices in the same kernel group can still have non working P2P.
> 
> Maybe:
> 
>  PCIe ACS settings control the level of isolation and the possible P2P
>  paths between devices. With greater isolation the kernel will create
>  smaller iommu_groups and with less isolation there is more HW that
>  can achieve P2P transfers. From a virtualization perspective all
>  devices in the same iommu_group must be assigned to the same VM as
>  they lack security isolation.
> 
>  There is no way for the kernel to automatically know the correct
>  ACS settings for any given system and workload. Existing command line
>  options allow only for large scale change, disabling all
>  isolation, but this is not sufficient for more complex cases.
> 
>  Add a kernel command-line option to directly control all the ACS bits
>  for specific devices, which allows the operator to setup the right
>  level of isolation to achieve the desired P2P configuration. The
>  definition is future proof, when new ACS bits are added to the spec
>  the open syntax can be extended.
> 
>  ACS needs to be setup early in the kernel boot as the ACS settings
>  effect how iommu_groups are formed. iommu_group formation is a one
>  time event during initial device discovery, changing ACS bits after
>  kernel boot can result in an inaccurate view of the iommu_groups
>  compared to the current isolation configuration.
>  
>  ACS applies to PCIe Downstream Ports and multi-function devices.
>  The default ACS settings are strict and deny any direct traffic
>  between two functions. This results in the smallest iommu_group the
>  HW can support. Frequently these values result in slow or
>  non-working P2PDMA.
> 
>  ACS offers a range of security choices controlling how traffic is
>  allowed to go directly between two devices. Some popular choices:
>    - Full prevention
>    - Translated requests can be direct, with various options
>    - Asymetric direct traffic, A can reach B but not the reverse
>    - All traffic can be direct
>  Along with some other less common ones for special topologies.
> 
>  The intention is that this option would be used with expert knowledge
>  of the HW capability and workload to achieve the desired
>  configuration.

That all sounds good.  IIUC the current default is full prevention (I
guess you said that a few paragraphs up).

It's unfortunate that this requires so much expert knowledge to use,
but I guess we don't really have a good alternative.  The only way I
can think of to help would be some kind of white paper or examples in
Documentation/PCI/.

Bjorn




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