On Tue, Apr 09, 2024 at 08:57:49PM +0300, Adrian Ratiu wrote:
> Prior to v2.6.39 write access to /proc/<pid>/mem was restricted,
> after which it got allowed in commit 198214a7ee50 ("proc: enable
> writing to /proc/pid/mem"). Famous last words from that patch:
> "no longer a security hazard". :)
>
> Afterwards exploits started causing drama like [1]. The exploits
> using /proc/*/mem can be rather sophisticated like [2] which
> installed an arbitrary payload from noexec storage into a running
> process then exec'd it, which itself could include an ELF loader
> to run arbitrary code off noexec storage.
>
> One of the well-known problems with /proc/*/mem writes is they
> ignore page permissions via FOLL_FORCE, as opposed to writes via
> process_vm_writev which respect page permissions. These writes can
> also be used to bypass mode bits.
>
> To harden against these types of attacks, distrbutions might want
> to restrict /proc/pid/mem accesses, either entirely or partially,
> for eg. to restrict FOLL_FORCE usage.
>
> Known valid use-cases which still need these accesses are:
>
> * Debuggers which also have ptrace permissions, so they can access
> memory anyway via PTRACE_POKEDATA & co. Some debuggers like GDB
> are designed to write /proc/pid/mem for basic functionality.
>
> * Container supervisors using the seccomp notifier to intercept
> syscalls and rewrite memory of calling processes by passing
> around /proc/pid/mem file descriptors.
>
> There might be more, that's why these params default to disabled.
>
> Regarding other mechanisms which can block these accesses:
>
> * seccomp filters can be used to block mmap/mprotect calls with W|X
> perms, but they often can't block open calls as daemons want to
> read/write their runtime state and seccomp filters cannot check
> file paths, so plain write calls can't be easily blocked.
>
> * Since the mem file is part of the dynamic /proc/<pid>/ space, we
> can't run chmod once at boot to restrict it (and trying to react
> to every process and run chmod doesn't scale, and the kernel no
> longer allows chmod on any of these paths).
>
> * SELinux could be used with a rule to cover all /proc/*/mem files,
> but even then having multiple ways to deny an attack is useful in
> case one layer fails.
>
> Thus we introduce three kernel parameters to restrict /proc/*/mem
> access: read, write and foll_force. All three can be independently
> set to the following values:
>
> all => restrict all access unconditionally.
> ptracer => restrict all access except for ptracer processes.
>
> If left unset, the existing behaviour is preserved, i.e. access
> is governed by basic file permissions.
>
> Examples which can be passed by bootloaders:
>
> restrict_proc_mem_foll_force=all
> restrict_proc_mem_write=ptracer
> restrict_proc_mem_read=ptracer
>
> Each distribution needs to decide what restrictions to apply,
> depending on its use-cases. Embedded systems might want to do
> more, while general-purpouse distros might want a more relaxed
> policy, because for e.g. foll_force=all and write=all both break
> break GDB, so it might be a bit excessive.
>
> Based on an initial patch by Mike Frysinger <vapier@xxxxxxxxxxxx>.
Thanks for this new version!
>
> Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/476947/ [1]
> Link: https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40089045 [2]
> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Doug Anderson <dianders@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Co-developed-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 27 +++++
> fs/proc/base.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++-
> include/linux/jump_label.h | 5 +
> 3 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 6e62b8cb19c8d..d7f7db41369c7 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -5665,6 +5665,33 @@
> reset_devices [KNL] Force drivers to reset the underlying device
> during initialization.
>
> + restrict_proc_mem_read= [KNL]
> + Format: {all | ptracer}
> + Allows restricting read access to /proc/*/mem files.
> + Depending on restriction level, open for reads return -EACCESS.
> + Can be one of:
> + - 'all' restricts all access unconditionally.
> + - 'ptracer' allows access only for ptracer processes.
> + If not specified, then basic file permissions continue to apply.
> +
> + restrict_proc_mem_write= [KNL]
> + Format: {all | ptracer}
> + Allows restricting write access to /proc/*/mem files.
> + Depending on restriction level, open for writes return -EACCESS.
> + Can be one of:
> + - 'all' restricts all access unconditionally.
> + - 'ptracer' allows access only for ptracer processes.
> + If not specified, then basic file permissions continue to apply.
> +
> + restrict_proc_mem_foll_force= [KNL]
> + Format: {all | ptracer}
> + Restricts the use of the FOLL_FORCE flag for /proc/*/mem access.
> + If restricted, the FOLL_FORCE flag will not be added to vm accesses.
> + Can be one of:
> + - 'all' restricts all access unconditionally.
> + - 'ptracer' allows access only for ptracer processes.
> + If not specified, FOLL_FORCE is always used.
bike shedding: I wonder if this should be a fake namespace (adding a dot
just to break it up for reading more easily), and have words reordered
to the kernel's more common subject-verb-object: proc_mem.restrict_read=...
> +
> resume= [SWSUSP]
> Specify the partition device for software suspend
> Format:
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 18550c071d71c..c733836c42a65 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -152,6 +152,41 @@ struct pid_entry {
> NULL, &proc_pid_attr_operations, \
> { .lsmid = LSMID })
>
> +/*
> + * each restrict_proc_mem_* param controls the following static branches:
> + * key[0] = restrict all writes
> + * key[1] = restrict writes except for ptracers
> + * key[2] = restrict all reads
> + * key[3] = restrict reads except for ptracers
> + * key[4] = restrict all FOLL_FORCE usage
> + * key[5] = restrict FOLL_FORCE usage except for ptracers
> + */
> +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_ARRAY_FALSE_RO(restrict_proc_mem, 6);
So, I don't like having open-coded numbers. And I'm not sure there's a
benefit to stuffing these all into an array? So:
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(proc_mem_restrict_read);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(proc_mem_restrict_write);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(proc_mem_restrict_foll_force);
> +
> +static int __init early_restrict_proc_mem(char *buf, int offset)
> +{
> + if (!buf)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (strncmp(buf, "all", 3) == 0)
I'd use strcmp() to get exact matches. That way "allalksdjflas" doesn't
match. :)
> + static_branch_enable(&restrict_proc_mem[offset]);
> + else if (strncmp(buf, "ptracer", 7) == 0)
> + static_branch_enable(&restrict_proc_mem[offset + 1]);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
Then don't bother with a common helper since you've got a macro, and
it'll all get tossed after __init anyway.
> +
> +#define DEFINE_EARLY_RESTRICT_PROC_MEM(name, offset) \
> +static int __init early_restrict_proc_mem_##name(char *buf) \
> +{ \
> + return early_restrict_proc_mem(buf, offset); \
> +} \
> +early_param("restrict_proc_mem_" #name, early_restrict_proc_mem_##name)
> +
> +DEFINE_EARLY_RESTRICT_PROC_MEM(write, 0);
> +DEFINE_EARLY_RESTRICT_PROC_MEM(read, 2);
> +DEFINE_EARLY_RESTRICT_PROC_MEM(foll_force, 4);
#define DEFINE_EARLY_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT(name) \
static int __init early_proc_mem_restrict_##name(char *buf) \
{ \
if (!buf) \
return -EINVAL; \
\
if (strcmp(buf, "all") == 0) \
static_branch_enable(&proc_mem_restrict_##name); \
else if (strcmp(buf, "ptracer") == 0) \
static_branch_enable(&proc_mem_restrict_##name); \
\
return 0; \
} \
early_param("proc_mem_restrict_" #name, early_proc_mem_restrict_##name)
> +
> /*
> * Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the .
> * and .. links.
> @@ -825,9 +860,58 @@ static int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static bool __mem_open_current_is_ptracer(struct file *file)
> +{
> + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> + struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
> + int ret = false;
> +
> + if (task) {
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + if (current == ptrace_parent(task))
> + ret = true;
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + put_task_struct(task);
> + }
This creates a ToCToU race between this check (which releases the task)
and the later memopen which make get a different task (and mm).
To deal with this, I think you need to add a new mode flag for
proc_mem_open(), and add the checking there.
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int __mem_open_check_access_restriction(struct file *file)
> +{
> + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
> + /* Deny if writes are unconditionally disabled via param */
> + if (static_branch_unlikely(&restrict_proc_mem[0]))
> + return -EACCES;
> +
> + /* Deny if writes are allowed only for ptracers via param */
> + if (static_branch_unlikely(&restrict_proc_mem[1]) &&
> + !__mem_open_current_is_ptracer(file))
> + return -EACCES;
> +
> + } else if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
I think this "else" means that O_RDWR opens will only check the write
flag, so drop the "else".
> + /* Deny if reads are unconditionally disabled via param */
> + if (static_branch_unlikely(&restrict_proc_mem[2]))
> + return -EACCES;
> +
> + /* Deny if reads are allowed only for ptracers via param */
> + if (static_branch_unlikely(&restrict_proc_mem[3]) &&
> + !__mem_open_current_is_ptracer(file))
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> {
> - int ret = __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = __mem_open_check_access_restriction(file);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + ret = __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
>
> /* OK to pass negative loff_t, we can catch out-of-range */
> file->f_mode |= FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET;
> @@ -835,6 +919,20 @@ static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static unsigned int __mem_rw_get_foll_force_flag(struct file *file)
> +{
> + /* Deny if FOLL_FORCE is disabled via param */
> + if (static_branch_unlikely(&restrict_proc_mem[4]))
> + return 0;
> +
> + /* Deny if FOLL_FORCE is allowed only for ptracers via param */
> + if (static_branch_unlikely(&restrict_proc_mem[5]) &&
> + !__mem_open_current_is_ptracer(file))
This is like the ToCToU: the task may have changed out from under us
between the open the read/write.
I'm not sure how to store this during "open" though... Hmmm
> + return 0;
> +
> + return FOLL_FORCE;
> +}
> +
> static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
> size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write)
> {
> @@ -855,7 +953,8 @@ static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
> if (!mmget_not_zero(mm))
> goto free;
>
> - flags = FOLL_FORCE | (write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0);
> + flags = (write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0);
> + flags |= __mem_rw_get_foll_force_flag(file);
I wonder if we need some way to track openers in the mm? That sounds
not-fun.
>
> while (count > 0) {
> size_t this_len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE);
> diff --git a/include/linux/jump_label.h b/include/linux/jump_label.h
> index f5a2727ca4a9a..ba2460fe878c5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/jump_label.h
> +++ b/include/linux/jump_label.h
> @@ -398,6 +398,11 @@ struct static_key_false {
> [0 ... (count) - 1] = STATIC_KEY_FALSE_INIT, \
> }
>
> +#define DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_ARRAY_FALSE_RO(name, count) \
> + struct static_key_false name[count] __ro_after_init = { \
> + [0 ... (count) - 1] = STATIC_KEY_FALSE_INIT, \
> + }
Let's not add this. :)
> +
> #define _DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_1(name) DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(name)
> #define _DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_0(name) DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(name)
> #define DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(cfg, name) \
So, yes, conceptually, I really like this -- we've got some good
granularity now, and wow do I love being able to turn off FOLL_FORCE. :)
Safely checking for ptracer is tricky, though. I wonder how we could
store the foll_force state in the private_data somehow. Seems a bit
painful to allocate a struct for it. We could do some really horrid
hacks like store it in the low bit of the mm address that gets stored to
private_data and mask it out when used, but that's really ugly too...
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
