On Wed, 2024-03-06 at 15:34 -0800, Fan Wu wrote:
> This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
> content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
>
> Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
> a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
> execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.
>
> This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
> ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
> in the critical boot phase.
>
> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> ---
> v1-v11:
> + Not present
>
> v12:
> + Introduced
>
> v13:
> + Rename the hook name to initramfs_populated()
>
> v14:
> + No changes
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
> include/linux/security.h | 8 ++++++++
> init/initramfs.c | 3 +++
> security/security.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 76458b6d53da..e0f50789a18f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -425,3 +425,5 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
> +
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, initramfs_populated, void)
I don't know, but why there is no super_block as parameter?
And, wouldn't be better to rely on existing hooks to identify inodes in
the initial ram disk?
(gdb) p *file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_type
$3 = {name = 0xffffffff826058a9 "rootfs"
That could also help if you want to enforce action based on the
filesystem name (and why not on the UUID too).
Roberto
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index d0eb20f90b26..619e17e59532 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -2167,4 +2167,12 @@ static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> +extern void security_initramfs_populated(void);
> +#else
> +static inline void security_initramfs_populated(void)
> +{
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> +
> #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
> diff --git a/init/initramfs.c b/init/initramfs.c
> index 76deb48c38cb..140619a583ff 100644
> --- a/init/initramfs.c
> +++ b/init/initramfs.c
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> #include <linux/init_syscalls.h>
> #include <linux/task_work.h>
> #include <linux/umh.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>
> static __initdata bool csum_present;
> static __initdata u32 io_csum;
> @@ -720,6 +721,8 @@ static void __init do_populate_rootfs(void *unused, async_cookie_t cookie)
> #endif
> }
>
> + security_initramfs_populated();
> +
> done:
> /*
> * If the initrd region is overlapped with crashkernel reserved region,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index f168bc30a60d..26c28db211fd 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -5619,3 +5619,13 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd);
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
> +
> +/**
> + * security_initramfs_populated() - Notify LSMs that initramfs has been loaded
> + *
> + * Tells the LSMs the initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
> + */
> +void security_initramfs_populated(void)
> +{
> + call_void_hook(initramfs_populated);
> +}
