Hello. On čtvrtek 15. února 2024 13:04:56 CET Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 09:34:38AM +0100, Lukas Bulwahn wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 9:01 AM Greg Kroah-Hartman > > <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > The Linux kernel project now has the ability to assign CVEs to fixed > > > issues, so document the process and how individual developers can get a > > > CVE if one is not automatically assigned for their fixes. > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > --- > > > v3: fix up wording in security-bugs.rst based on the changes to the cve > > > assignment process from v1, thanks to a private reviewer for > > > pointing that out. > > > v2: Grammer fixes based on review from Randy > > > Updated paragraph about how CVE identifiers will be assigned > > > (automatically when added to stable trees, or ask us for one > > > directly before that happens if so desired) > > > > > > > Hi Greg, Sasha, Lee, > > > > Generally, I think this is a great step forward on the whole "security > > vulnerability mess" and this will certainly help me and others in the > > embedded space to argue to update to recent stable kernel versions. > > This can then finally put the practice of shipping multiple-year-old > > kernel versions to an end. Often this was just done with the argument > > that there is not a recent CVE and fix assigned to some recent stable > > kernel version---and integrators think updates to recent kernel stable > > versions are not needed and not recommended. > > > > I am looking forward to seeing what and how many stable commits are > > going to get CVEs assigned. If Greg's policy from the Kernel Recipes > > 2019 presentation comes into play, every git kernel hash (GKH)---at > > least in the stable tree---could get a CVE identifier (just to be on > > the safe side). But I assume you are going to use some expert > > knowledge, heuristics or some machine-learning AI to make some commits > > in the stable tree carrying a CVE identifier and some others not. > > Yes, that "expert knowledge" will be "review all patches by hand" just > like we do today for all that are included in the stable trees. Not undermining your efforts in any way, but I'd like to get an honest answer: is this really true? For instance, $ git log --oneline v6.7.1..v6.7.2 | wc -l 641 Is it physically possible to actually review all these backports in just five days? Thank you. > > > Reviewed-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@xxxxxxxxx> > > Thanks for the review. > > > > +Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE®) numbers were developed as an > > > +unambiguous way to identify, define, and catalog publicly disclosed > > > +security vulnerabilities. Over time, their usefulness has declined with > > > +regards to the kernel project, and CVE numbers were very often assigned > > > +in inappropriate ways and for inappropriate reasons. Because of this, > > > +the kernel development community has tended to avoid them. However, the > > > +combination of continuing pressure to assign CVEs and other forms of > > > +security identifiers, and ongoing abuses by community members outside of > > > +the kernel community has made it clear that the kernel community should > > > +have control over those assignments. > > > + > > > > Though, I get what is meant with "the community members outside of the > > kernel community", it still feels strange when reading. > > > > Here are some alternatives I could come up with: > > > > "reporters outside the kernel community" > > "reporters beyond the actively contributing/engaged kernel community members" > > "individuals not engaged with the kernel community" > > "community members" is a strange wording, you are right, I've replaced > it with "individuals and companies" as it has been both abusing the > system (and "individuals at companies", but that's just nit-picking...) > > > > +The Linux kernel developer team does have the ability to assign CVEs for > > > +potential Linux kernel security issues. This assignment is independent > > > +of the :doc:`normal Linux kernel security bug reporting > > > +process<../process/security_bugs>`. > > > + > > > +A list of all assigned CVEs for the Linux kernel can be found in the > > > +archives of the linux-cve mailing list, as seen on > > > +https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/. To get notice of the > > > +assigned CVEs, please subscribe to that mailing list. > > > + > > > +Process > > > +------- > > > + > > > +As part of the normal stable release process, kernel changes that are > > > +potentially security issues are identified by the developers responsible > > > +for CVE number assignments and have CVE numbers automatically assigned > > > +to them. These assignments are published on the linux-cve-announce > > > +mailing list as announcements on a frequent basis. > > > + > > > +Note, due to the layer at which the Linux kernel is in a system, almost > > > +any bug might be exploitable to compromise the security of the kernel, > > > > Just a nit: but I would say: a kernel bug is compromising the > > "security of the system"; the kernel bug just happens to allow anyone > > to run any code on their hardware... in some systems that is a > > security issue, but in my previous MSDOS system that was the default > > behaviour ;) > > Good change, made, thanks! > > greg k-h > > -- Oleksandr Natalenko (post-factum)
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