(+Cc Kees) On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 18:14:49 +0000 "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Wed, 2024-02-14 at 17:41 +0100, Petr Tesařík wrote: > > Second, a sandbox can run unmodified kernel code and interact > > directly > > with other parts of the kernel. It's not really possible with this > > initial patch series, but the plan is that sandbox mode can share > > locks > > with the kernel. > > > > Third, sandbox code can be trusted for operations like parsing keys > > for > > the trusted keychain if the kernel is locked down, i.e. when even a > > process with UID 0 is not on the same trust level as kernel mode. > > What use case needs to have the sandbox both protected from the kernel > (trusted operations) and non-privileged (the kernel protected from it > via CPL3)? It seems like opposite things. I think I have mentioned one: parsing keys for the trusted keyring. The parser is complex enough to be potentially buggy, but the security folks have already dismissed the idea to run it as a user mode helper. Petr T
