So we have recently discovered an overlooked interaction with VT-x.
Immediately before VMENTER and after VMEXIT, CR2 is live with the
*guest* CR2. Regardless of if the guest uses FRED or not, this is guest
state and SHOULD NOT be corrupted. Furthermore, host state MUST NOT leak
into the guest.
NMIs are blocked on VMEXIT if the cause was an NMI, but not for other
reasons, so a NMI coming in during this window that then #PFs could
corrupt the guest CR2.
Intel is exploring ways to close this hole, but for schedule reasons, it
will not be available at the same time as the first implementation of
FRED. Therefore, as a workaround, it turns out that the FRED NMI stub
*will*, unfortunately, have to save and restore CR2 after all when (at
least) Intel KVM is in use.
Note that this is airtight: it does add a performance penalty to the NMI
path (two read CR2 in the common case of no #PF), but there is no gap
during which a bad CR2 value could be introduced in the guest, no matter
in which sequence the events happen.
In theory the performance penalty could be further reduced by
conditionalizing this on the NMI happening in the critical region in the
KVM code, but it seems to be pretty far from necessary to me.
This obviously was an unfortunate oversight on our part, but the
workaround is simple and doesn't affect any non-NMI paths.
-hpa
On 12/5/23 02:50, Xin Li wrote:
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && arch_cpu_is_offline(smp_processor_id()))
+ return;
+
This is cut & paste from elsewhere in the NMI code, but I believe the
IS_ENABLED() is unnecessary (not to mention ugly): smp_processor_id()
should always return zero on UP, and arch_cpu_is_offline() reduces to
!(cpu == 0), so this is a statically true condition on UP.
-hpa
