On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 12:36:01PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 01:08:21AM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote:
>
> > +.macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
> > + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_verw_\@;", "jmp .Ldo_verw_\@", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
> > + /* nopl __KERNEL_DS(%rax) */
> > + .byte 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00;
> > +.Lverw_arg_\@: .word __KERNEL_DS;
> > +.Ldo_verw_\@: verw _ASM_RIP(.Lverw_arg_\@);
> > +.Lskip_verw_\@:
> > +.endm
>
> Why can't this be:
>
> ALTERNATIVE "". "verw _ASM_RIP(mds_verw_sel)", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
>
> And have that mds_verw_sel thing be out-of-line ? That gives much better
> code for the case where we don't need this.
Overall the code generated with this approach is much better. But, in my
testing I am seeing an issue with runtime patching in 32-bit mode, when
mitigations are off. Instead of NOPs I am seeing random instruction. I
don't see any issue with 64-bit mode.
config1: mitigations=on, 32-bit mode, post-boot
entry_SYSENTER_32:
...
0xc1a3748e <+222>: pop %eax
0xc1a3748f <+223>: verw 0xc1a38240
0xc1a37496 <+230>: sti
0xc1a37497 <+231>: sysexit
---------------------------------------------
config2: mitigations=off, 32-bit mode, post-boot
entry_SYSENTER_32:
...
0xc1a3748e <+222>: pop %eax
0xc1a3748f <+223>: lea 0x0(%esi,%eiz,1),%esi <---- Doesn't look right
0xc1a37496 <+230>: sti
0xc1a37497 <+231>: sysexit
---------------------------------------------
config3: 32-bit mode, pre-boot objdump
entry_SYSENTER_32:
...
c8e: 58 pop %eax
c8f: 90 nop
c90: 90 nop
c91: 90 nop
c92: 90 nop
c93: 90 nop
c94: 90 nop
c95: 90 nop
c96: fb sti
c97: 0f 35 sysexit
These tests were done with below patch:
-----8<-----
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2023 15:04:56 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Add asm helpers for executing VERW
MDS mitigation requires clearing the CPU buffers before returning to
user. This needs to be done late in the exit-to-user path. Current
location of VERW leaves a possibility of kernel data ending up in CPU
buffers for memory accesses done after VERW such as:
1. Kernel data accessed by an NMI between VERW and return-to-user can
remain in CPU buffers ( since NMI returning to kernel does not
execute VERW to clear CPU buffers.
2. Alyssa reported that after VERW is executed,
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y scrubs the stack used by a system
call. Memory accesses during stack scrubbing can move kernel stack
contents into CPU buffers.
3. When caller saved registers are restored after a return from
function executing VERW, the kernel stack accesses can remain in
CPU buffers(since they occur after VERW).
To fix this VERW needs to be moved very late in exit-to-user path.
In preparation for moving VERW to entry/exit asm code, create macros
that can be used in asm. Also make them depend on a new feature flag
X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF.
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@xxxxxxxxx>
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 58cb9495e40f..f21fc0f12737 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -308,10 +308,10 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SMBA (11*32+21) /* "" Slow Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
#define X86_FEATURE_BMEC (11*32+22) /* "" Bandwidth Monitoring Event Configuration */
#define X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK (11*32+23) /* Shadow stack support for user mode applications */
-
#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO (11*32+24) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs */
#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS (11*32+25) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT (11*32+26) /* "" Issue an IBPB only on VMEXIT */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF (11*32+27) /* "" Clear CPU buffers */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index c55cc243592e..ed8218e2d9a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <asm/segment.h>
/*
* Call depth tracking for Intel SKL CPUs to address the RSB underflow
@@ -329,6 +330,29 @@
#endif
.endm
+/*
+ * Macros to execute VERW instruction that mitigate transient data sampling
+ * attacks such as MDS. On affected systems a microcode update overloaded VERW
+ * instruction to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers CFLAGS.ZF.
+ *
+ * Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers.
+ */
+.pushsection .rodata
+.align 64
+mds_verw_sel:
+ .word __KERNEL_DS
+ .byte 0xcc
+.align 64
+.popsection
+
+.macro EXEC_VERW
+ verw _ASM_RIP(mds_verw_sel)
+.endm
+
+.macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+ ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(EXEC_VERW), X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
+.endm
+
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
--
2.34.1
