Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@xxxxxxxxxx> writes: > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > index d85d90f5d000..3c53a238332a 100644 > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > @@ -450,6 +450,20 @@ this allows system administrators to override the > ``IA64_THREAD_UAC_NOPRINT`` ``prctl`` and avoid logs being flooded. > > > +io_uring_disabled > +========================= > + > +Prevents all processes from creating new io_uring instances. Enabling this > +shrinks the kernel's attack surface. > + > += ============================================================= > +0 All processes can create io_uring instances as normal. This is the default > + setting. > +1 io_uring is disabled. io_uring_setup always fails with -EPERM. Existing > + io_uring instances can still be used. > += ============================================================= I had an internal request for something like this recently. If we go this route, we could use a intermediary option that limits io_uring to root processes only. -- Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
