Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM

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On 14/01/2023 00:37, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Fri, Dec 02, 2022, Chao Peng wrote:
This patch series implements KVM guest private memory for confidential
computing scenarios like Intel TDX[1]. If a TDX host accesses
TDX-protected guest memory, machine check can happen which can further
crash the running host system, this is terrible for multi-tenant
configurations. The host accesses include those from KVM userspace like
QEMU. This series addresses KVM userspace induced crash by introducing
new mm and KVM interfaces so KVM userspace can still manage guest memory
via a fd-based approach, but it can never access the guest memory
content.

The patch series touches both core mm and KVM code. I appreciate
Andrew/Hugh and Paolo/Sean can review and pick these patches. Any other
reviews are always welcome.
   - 01: mm change, target for mm tree
   - 02-09: KVM change, target for KVM tree

A version with all of my feedback, plus reworked versions of Vishal's selftest,
is available here:

   git@xxxxxxxxxx:sean-jc/linux.git x86/upm_base_support

It compiles and passes the selftest, but it's otherwise barely tested.  There are
a few todos (2 I think?) and many of the commits need changelogs, i.e. it's still
a WIP.


When running LTP (https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp) on the v10
bits (and also with Sean's branch above) I encounter the following NULL
pointer dereference with testcases/kernel/syscalls/madvise/madvise01
(100% reproducible).

It appears that in restrictedmem_error_page() inode->i_mapping->private_data is NULL
in the list_for_each_entry_safe(inode, next, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list)
but I don't know why.


[ 5365.177168] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
[ 5365.178881] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 5365.180006] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 5365.181322] PGD 8000000109dad067 P4D 8000000109dad067 PUD 107707067 PMD 0
[ 5365.183474] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 5365.184792] CPU: 0 PID: 22086 Comm: madvise01 Not tainted 6.1.0-1.el8.seanjcupm.x86_64 #1 [ 5365.186572] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.5.1 06/16/2021
[ 5365.188816] RIP: 0010:restrictedmem_error_page+0xc7/0x1b0
[ 5365.190081] Code: 99 00 48 8b 55 00 48 8b 02 48 8d 8a e8 fe ff ff 48 2d 18 01 00 00 48 39 d5 0f 84 8a 00 00 00 48 8b 51 30 48 8b 92 b8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 28 4c 39 b1 d8 00 00 00 74 22 48 8b 88 18 01 00 00 48 8d
[ 5365.193984] RSP: 0018:ffff9b7343c07d80 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 5365.195142] RAX: ffff8e5b410cfc70 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff8e5b4048e580 [ 5365.196888] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 5365.198399] RBP: ffff8e5b410cfd88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5365.200200] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 5365.201843] R13: ffff8e5b410cfd80 R14: ffff8e5b47cc7618 R15: ffffd49d44c05080 [ 5365.203472] FS: 00007fc96de9b5c0(0000) GS:ffff8e5deda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5365.205485] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5365.206791] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 000000012047e002 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
[ 5365.208131] Call Trace:
[ 5365.208752]  <TASK>
[ 5365.209229]  me_pagecache_clean+0x58/0x100
[ 5365.210196]  identify_page_state+0x84/0xd0
[ 5365.211180]  memory_failure+0x231/0x8b0
[ 5365.212148]  madvise_inject_error.cold+0x8d/0xa4
[ 5365.213317]  do_madvise+0x363/0x3a0
[ 5365.214177]  __x64_sys_madvise+0x2c/0x40
[ 5365.215159]  do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5365.216016]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 5365.217130] RIP: 0033:0x7fc96d8399ab
[ 5365.217953] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d dd 54 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 1c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ad 54 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 5365.222323] RSP: 002b:00007fff62a99b18 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000001c [ 5365.224026] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000041ce00 RCX: 00007fc96d8399ab [ 5365.225375] RDX: 0000000000000064 RSI: 000000000000a000 RDI: 00007fc96de8e000 [ 5365.226999] RBP: 00007fc96de9b540 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000415c80 [ 5365.228641] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000008 [ 5365.230074] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Regards,
Liam

As for next steps, can you (handwaving all of the TDX folks) take a look at what
I pushed and see if there's anything horrifically broken, and that it still works
for TDX?

Fuad (and pKVM folks) same ask for you with respect to pKVM.  Absolutely no rush
(and I mean that).

On my side, the two things on my mind are (a) tests and (b) downstream dependencies
(SEV and TDX).  For tests, I want to build a lists of tests that are required for
merging so that the criteria for merging are clear, and so that if the list is large
(haven't thought much yet), the work of writing and running tests can be distributed.

Regarding downstream dependencies, before this lands, I want to pull in all the
TDX and SNP series and see how everything fits together.  Specifically, I want to
make sure that we don't end up with a uAPI that necessitates ugly code, and that we
don't miss an opportunity to make things simpler.  The patches in the SNP series to
add "legacy" SEV support for UPM in particular made me slightly rethink some minor
details.  Nothing remotely major, but something that needs attention since it'll
be uAPI.

I'm off Monday, so it'll be at least Tuesday before I make any more progress on
my side.

Thanks!





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