The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
properly.
Shadow stack memory is writable only in very specific, controlled ways.
However, since it is writable, the kernel treats it as such. As a result
there remain many ways for userspace to trigger the kernel to write to
shadow stack's via get_user_pages(, FOLL_WRITE) operations. To make this a
little less exposed, block writable GUPs for shadow stack VMAs.
Still allow FOLL_FORCE to write through shadow stack protections, as it
does for read-only protections.
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@xxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
---
v3:
- Add comment in __pte_access_permitted() (Dave)
- Remove unneeded shadow stack specific check in
__pte_access_permitted() (Jann)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 +++++
mm/gup.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index d57dc1b2d3e8..0d18f3a4373d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1637,6 +1637,11 @@ static inline bool __pte_access_permitted(unsigned long pteval, bool write)
{
unsigned long need_pte_bits = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER;
+ /*
+ * Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs are shadow stack, which the kernel
+ * shouldn't generally allow access to, but since they
+ * are already Write=0, the below logic covers both cases.
+ */
if (write)
need_pte_bits |= _PAGE_RW;
diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index fe195d47de74..411befd4d431 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)
return -EFAULT;
if (write) {
- if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
+ if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE) || (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
return -EFAULT;
/*
--
2.17.1
