On Fri, Sep 30, 2022 at 9:16 PM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 9/29/22 15:29, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> > @@ -1633,6 +1633,9 @@ static inline bool __pte_access_permitted(unsigned long pteval, bool write)
> > {
> > unsigned long need_pte_bits = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER;
> >
> > + if (write && (pteval & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)) == _PAGE_DIRTY)
> > + return 0;
>
> Do we not have a helper for this? Seems a bit messy to open-code these
> shadow-stack permissions. Definitely at least needs a comment.
FWIW, if you look at more context around this diff, the function looks
like this:
static inline bool __pte_access_permitted(unsigned long pteval, bool write)
{
unsigned long need_pte_bits = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER;
+ if (write && (pteval & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)) == _PAGE_DIRTY)
+ return 0;
+
if (write)
need_pte_bits |= _PAGE_RW;
if ((pteval & need_pte_bits) != need_pte_bits)
return 0;
return __pkru_allows_pkey(pte_flags_pkey(pteval), write);
}
So I think this change is actually a no-op - the only thing it does is
to return 0 if write==1, !_PAGE_RW, and _PAGE_DIRTY. But the check
below will always return 0 if !_PAGE_RW, unless I'm misreading it? And
this is the only patch in the series that touches this function, so
it's not like this becomes necessary with a later patch in the series
either.
Should this check go in anyway for clarity reasons, or should this
instead be a comment explaining that __pte_access_permitted() behaves
just like the hardware access check, which means shadow pages are
treated as readonly?
