On Sat, Jan 21, 2012 at 1:03 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxx> wrote: > * Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> @@ -702,6 +704,9 @@ static int mem_open(struct inode* inode, struct file* file) >> struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode); >> struct mm_struct *mm; >> >> + if (sysctl_proc_pid_mem < 1) >> + return -EACCES; > > This looks like an unprivileged user-space triggerable memory > leak DoS. The task reference is already acquired at that point. Ah, good catch; thanks. I'll respin. -Kees -- Kees Cook ChromeOS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
