On Mon, Mar 03, 2025 at 05:40:54PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 12:52 PM Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > On Feb 28, 2025, at 9:14 AM, Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 9:09 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > >> On Thu, 2025-02-27 at 17:22 -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > >>> > > >>> I'd still also like to see some discussion about moving towards the > > >>> addition of keyrings oriented towards usage instead of limiting > > >>> ourselves to keyrings that are oriented on the source of the keys. > > >>> Perhaps I'm missing some important detail which makes this > > >>> impractical, but it seems like an obvious improvement to me and would > > >>> go a long way towards solving some of the problems that we typically > > >>> see with kernel keys. > > > > The intent is not to limit ourselves to the source of the key. The main > > point of Clavis is to allow the end-user to determine what kernel keys > > they want to trust and for what purpose, irrespective of the originating > > source (.builtin_trusted, .secondary, .machine, or .platform). If we could > > go back in time, individual keyrings could be created that are oriented > > toward usage. The idea for introducing Clavis is to bridge what we > > have today with kernel keys and allow them to be usage based. > > While it is unlikely that the current well known keyrings could be > removed, I see no reason why new usage oriented keyrings could not be > introduced. We've seen far more significant shifts in the kernel over > the years. Could we implement such change in a way that these new imaginary (at this point) usage oriented keyrings would be used to create the "legacy" keyrings? > > -- > paul-moore.com > BR, Jarkko
