On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 03:41:18PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Mon, 2025-01-06 at 17:15 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote: > > > > > On Jan 5, 2025, at 8:40 PM, Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 3, 2025 at 11:48 PM Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > Regardless, back to Clavis ... reading quickly through the cover > > > > letter again, I do somewhat wonder if this isn't better integrated > > > > into the keyring proper; have you talked to both David and Jarkko > > > > about this? > > > > > > I realize I should probably expand on my thinking a bit, especially > > > since my comment a while regarding LSMs dedicated to enforcing access > > > control on keys is what was given as a reason for making Clavis a LSM. > > > > > > I still stand by my comment from over a year ago that I see no reason > > > why we couldn't support a LSM that enforces access controls on > > > keyrings/keys. What gives me pause with the Clavis LSM is that so > > > much of Clavis is resident in the keyrings themselves, e.g. Clavis > > > policy ACLs and authorization keys, that it really feels like it > > > should be part of the keys subsystem and not a LSM. Yes, existing > > > LSMs do have LSM specific data that resides outside of the LSM and in > > > an object's subsystem, but that is usually limited to security > > > identifiers and similar things, not the LSM's security policy. > > Hi Jarkko, David, > > Both Paul's and my main concerns with this patch set is storing policy in the > keyring. We would appreciate your chiming in here about storing key policy in > the keyring itself. Right so the problem here would be that keyring defines policy for keys? Like in abstract "textbook sense" a policy should not live within in the closure that it dictactes. And the most classic issue would be probably circular dependencies. Theory aside, in practical sense, can you spot an example from the patch set where we could introduce issue by having Clavis as it is? > > thanks, > > Mimi BR, Jarkko
