On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 1:08 AM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > On Fri, Nov 01 2024 at 00:37, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Thu Oct 31, 2024 at 9:25 PM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > >> So this looks pretty reasonable to me by now and I'm inclined to take it > >> through the tip x86 tree, but that needs reviewed/acked-by's from the > >> crypto and TPM folks. EFI has been reviewed already. > >> > >> Can we make progress on this please? > > > > So TPM patches do have bunch of glitches: > > > > - 15/20: I don't get this. There is nothing to report unless tree > > is falling. The reported-by tag literally meaningless. Maybe this > > is something that makes sense with this feature. Explain from that > > angle. > > - 16/20: Is this actually a bug fix? If it is should be before 15/20. > > - 17/20: the commit message could do a better job explaining how the > > locality can vary. I'm not sure how this will be used by rest of > > the patch set. > > - 18/20: I'm not confident we want to give privilege to set locality > > to the user space. The commit message neither makes a case of this. > > Has this been tested to together with bus encryption (just checking)? > > Can you please explicitely voice your detailed technical concerns in > replies to the actual patches? - 15/20 looks like a rigged patch. I don't really know why it is done so it is hard to either suggest how "resolve it". - 16/20 probably makes sense but if it is a bug fix or part of it is, the bug fix should have relevant fixes etc tags so that it can be picked up to stable kernels. - 17-18/20: I'd speak about this as the "one whole" i.e. here the privilege to be able change locality during run-time is really concerning. Could the locality be figured out for the kernel command-line instead? The sysfs attribute can exist as read-only. So yeah, the way I see it 15-16 are the more trivial issue to sort out (probably) but with 17-18 we have an actual architectural concern for kernel overall. > Thanks, > > tglx BR, Jarkko
