On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 12:19:45PM +0200, Klara Modin wrote: > On 2024-10-21 21:02, Lukas Wunner wrote: > > On Mon, Oct 21, 2024 at 06:08:03PM +0200, Klara Modin wrote: > > > This commit (1e562deacecca1f1bec7d23da526904a1e87525e in next-20241021) > > > seems to break connecting to wpa2-enterprise with iwd. [...] > > There is a *second* issue I discovered last week. I cooked up > > a fix this morning, but haven't written a commit message yet. > > The patch is included below and it could indeed solve the > > problem because it fixes an issue introduced by the commit you > > identified as culprit. [...] > Tested on top of yesterday's next-20241022. > > With the first patch only there is no change, same behavior as previously. > > With the second patch only I get an oops, similar as the one you mentioned > in the first fix > > With both patches everything seems to work as expected. Thanks! Thanks a lot for your testing efforts, this helps greatly! I've dug into the source code of iwd (Intel Wireless Daemon) and the ell library it uses (Embedded Linux Library). It turns out that the patch I sent you is sufficient when using TLS 1.2 or newer for EAP (which I assume is true in your case). But the patch is *not* sufficient for TLS 1.1 or earlier. Normally RSA PKCS#1 encoding requires that the hash is prepended by a Full Hash Prefix (an ASN.1 sequence which identifies the hash algorithm used). But it turns out there are legacy protocols such as TLS 1.1 or earlier as well as IKEv1 which omit the Full Hash Prefix. The kernel supported this prior to 1e562deacecc. Although TLS 1.1 was deprecated in 2021 by RFC 8996, I think we cannot just remove support without advance notice. So below is a new patch which reinstates support for these legacy protocols. It should also fix the issue you're seeing with TLS 1.2 or newer (which is caused by invoking KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY without specifying a hash algorithm). The patch below replaces the one I sent on Monday. You'll still need the other pending fix: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ff7a28cddfc28e7a3fb8292c680510f35ec54391.1728898147.git.lukas@xxxxxxxxx/ Would you mind testing this combination? It did work in my own testing, but if you could test it as well that would raise the confidence. I've looked at the source code of wpa_supplicant as well as various IKEv1 daemons (strongswan, libreswan, isakmpd, raccoon) and none of them seems to use the kernel's Key Retention Service, so iwd is the only known user space application affected so far. Thanks, Lukas -- >8 -- diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index c98c158..bbd07a9 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3) pkey->pkey_algo); } else { if (!hash_algo) - return -EINVAL; + hash_algo = "none"; n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1(%s,%s)", pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo); diff --git a/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c b/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c index 9c28f1c..4d077fc9 100644 --- a/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c +++ b/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ * https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580#table-24 */ +static const u8 hash_prefix_none[] = { }; + static const u8 hash_prefix_md5[] = { 0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, /* SEQUENCE (SEQUENCE (OID */ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, /* <algorithm>, */ @@ -93,6 +95,7 @@ size_t size; } hash_prefixes[] = { #define _(X) { #X, hash_prefix_##X, sizeof(hash_prefix_##X) } + _(none), _(md5), _(sha1), _(rmd160), @@ -119,9 +122,18 @@ static const struct hash_prefix *rsassa_pkcs1_find_hash_prefix(const char *name) return NULL; } -static unsigned int rsassa_pkcs1_hash_len(const struct hash_prefix *p) +static bool rsassa_pkcs1_invalid_hash_len(unsigned int len, + const struct hash_prefix *p) { /* + * Legacy protocols such as TLS 1.1 or earlier and IKE version 1 + * do not prepend a Full Hash Prefix to the hash. In that case, + * the size of the Full Hash Prefix is zero. + */ + if (p->data == hash_prefix_none) + return false; + + /* * The final byte of the Full Hash Prefix encodes the hash length. * * This needs to be revisited should hash algorithms with more than @@ -130,7 +142,7 @@ static unsigned int rsassa_pkcs1_hash_len(const struct hash_prefix *p) */ static_assert(HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE <= 127); - return p->data[p->size - 1]; + return len != p->data[p->size - 1]; } struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx { @@ -167,7 +179,7 @@ static int rsassa_pkcs1_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm, if (dlen < ctx->key_size) return -EOVERFLOW; - if (slen != rsassa_pkcs1_hash_len(hash_prefix)) + if (rsassa_pkcs1_invalid_hash_len(slen, hash_prefix)) return -EINVAL; if (slen + hash_prefix->size > ctx->key_size - 11) @@ -237,7 +249,7 @@ static int rsassa_pkcs1_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm, /* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 1 - length checking */ if (!ctx->key_size || slen != ctx->key_size || - dlen != rsassa_pkcs1_hash_len(hash_prefix)) + rsassa_pkcs1_invalid_hash_len(dlen, hash_prefix)) return -EINVAL; /* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 2 - RSA verification */ diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index 7d768f0..86126be 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -5540,6 +5540,12 @@ static int alg_test_null(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, .cipher = __VECS(fcrypt_pcbc_tv_template) } }, { + .alg = "pkcs1(rsa,none)", + .test = alg_test_sig, + .suite = { + .sig = __VECS(pkcs1_rsa_none_tv_template) + } + }, { .alg = "pkcs1(rsa,sha224)", .test = alg_test_null, .fips_allowed = 1, diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h index 55aae18..d4c232a 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.h +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h @@ -1983,6 +1983,61 @@ struct kpp_testvec { }; /* + * PKCS#1 RSA test vectors for hash algorithm "none" + * (i.e. the hash in "m" is not prepended by a Full Hash Prefix) + * + * Obtained from: + * https://vcsjones.dev/sometimes-valid-rsa-dotnet/ + * https://gist.github.com/vcsjones/ab4c2327b53ed018eada76b75ef4fd99 + */ +static const struct sig_testvec pkcs1_rsa_none_tv_template[] = { + { + .key = + "\x30\x82\x01\x0a\x02\x82\x01\x01\x00\xa2\x63\x0b\x39\x44\xb8\xbb" + "\x23\xa7\x44\x49\xbb\x0e\xff\xa1\xf0\x61\x0a\x53\x93\xb0\x98\xdb" + "\xad\x2c\x0f\x4a\xc5\x6e\xff\x86\x3c\x53\x55\x0f\x15\xce\x04\x3f" + "\x2b\xfd\xa9\x96\x96\xd9\xbe\x61\x79\x0b\x5b\xc9\x4c\x86\x76\xe5" + "\xe0\x43\x4b\x22\x95\xee\xc2\x2b\x43\xc1\x9f\xd8\x68\xb4\x8e\x40" + "\x4f\xee\x85\x38\xb9\x11\xc5\x23\xf2\x64\x58\xf0\x15\x32\x6f\x4e" + "\x57\xa1\xae\x88\xa4\x02\xd7\x2a\x1e\xcd\x4b\xe1\xdd\x63\xd5\x17" + "\x89\x32\x5b\xb0\x5e\x99\x5a\xa8\x9d\x28\x50\x0e\x17\xee\x96\xdb" + "\x61\x3b\x45\x51\x1d\xcf\x12\x56\x0b\x92\x47\xfc\xab\xae\xf6\x66" + "\x3d\x47\xac\x70\x72\xe7\x92\xe7\x5f\xcd\x10\xb9\xc4\x83\x64\x94" + "\x19\xbd\x25\x80\xe1\xe8\xd2\x22\xa5\xd0\xba\x02\x7a\xa1\x77\x93" + "\x5b\x65\xc3\xee\x17\x74\xbc\x41\x86\x2a\xdc\x08\x4c\x8c\x92\x8c" + "\x91\x2d\x9e\x77\x44\x1f\x68\xd6\xa8\x74\x77\xdb\x0e\x5b\x32\x8b" + "\x56\x8b\x33\xbd\xd9\x63\xc8\x49\x9d\x3a\xc5\xc5\xea\x33\x0b\xd2" + "\xf1\xa3\x1b\xf4\x8b\xbe\xd9\xb3\x57\x8b\x3b\xde\x04\xa7\x7a\x22" + "\xb2\x24\xae\x2e\xc7\x70\xc5\xbe\x4e\x83\x26\x08\xfb\x0b\xbd\xa9" + "\x4f\x99\x08\xe1\x10\x28\x72\xaa\xcd\x02\x03\x01\x00\x01", + .key_len = 294, + .m = + "\x68\xb4\xf9\x26\x34\x31\x25\xdd\x26\x50\x13\x68\xc1\x99\x26\x71" + "\x19\xa2\xde\x81", + .m_size = 20, + .c = + "\x6a\xdb\x39\xe5\x63\xb3\x25\xde\x58\xca\xc3\xf1\x36\x9c\x0b\x36" + "\xb7\xd6\x69\xf9\xba\xa6\x68\x14\x8c\x24\x52\xd3\x25\xa5\xf3\xad" + "\xc9\x47\x44\xde\x06\xd8\x0f\x56\xca\x2d\xfb\x0f\xe9\x99\xe2\x9d" + "\x8a\xe8\x7f\xfb\x9a\x99\x96\xf1\x2c\x4a\xe4\xc0\xae\x4d\x29\x47" + "\x38\x96\x51\x2f\x6d\x8e\xb8\x88\xbd\x1a\x0a\x70\xbc\x23\x38\x67" + "\x62\x22\x01\x23\x71\xe5\xbb\x95\xea\x6b\x8d\x31\x62\xbf\xf0\xc4" + "\xb9\x46\xd6\x67\xfc\x4c\xe6\x1f\xd6\x5d\xf7\xa9\xad\x3a\xf1\xbf" + "\xa2\xf9\x66\xde\xb6\x8e\xec\x8f\x81\x8d\x1e\x3a\x12\x27\x6a\xfc" + "\xae\x92\x9f\xc3\x87\xc3\xba\x8d\x04\xb8\x8f\x0f\x61\x68\x9a\x96" + "\x2c\x80\x2c\x32\x40\xde\x9d\xb9\x9b\xe2\xe4\x45\x2e\x91\x47\x5c" + "\x47\xa4\x9d\x02\x57\x59\xf7\x75\x5d\x5f\x32\x82\x75\x5d\xe5\x78" + "\xc9\x19\x61\x46\x06\x9d\xa5\x1d\xd6\x32\x48\x9a\xdb\x09\x29\x81" + "\x14\x2e\xf0\x27\xe9\x37\x13\x74\xec\xa5\xcd\x67\x6b\x19\xf6\x88" + "\xf0\xc2\x8b\xa8\x7f\x2f\x76\x5a\x3e\x0c\x47\x5d\xe8\x82\x50\x27" + "\x40\xce\x27\x41\x45\xa0\xcf\xaa\x2f\xd3\xad\x3c\xbf\x73\xff\x93" + "\xe3\x78\x49\xd9\xa9\x78\x22\x81\x9a\xe5\xe2\x94\xe9\x40\xab\xf1", + .c_size = 256, + .public_key_vec = true, + }, +}; + +/* * PKCS#1 RSA test vectors. Obtained from CAVS testing. */ static const struct sig_testvec pkcs1_rsa_tv_template[] = {
