When extracting a signature component r or s from an ASN.1-encoded
integer, ecdsa_get_signature_rs() subtracts the expected length
"bufsize" from the ASN.1 length "vlen" (both of unsigned type size_t)
and stores the result in "diff" (of signed type ssize_t).
This results in a signed integer overflow if vlen > SSIZE_MAX + bufsize.
The kernel is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow, which implies -fwrapv,
meaning signed integer overflow is not undefined behavior. And the
function does check for overflow:
if (-diff >= bufsize)
return -EINVAL;
So the code is fine in principle but not very obvious. In the future it
might trigger a false-positive with CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP=y.
Avoid by comparing the two unsigned variables directly and erroring out
if "vlen" is too large.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
---
crypto/ecdsa.c | 17 ++++-------------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c
index f63731fb7535..03f608132242 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c
@@ -35,29 +35,20 @@ static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen, unsigned int ndigits)
{
size_t bufsize = ndigits * sizeof(u64);
- ssize_t diff = vlen - bufsize;
const char *d = value;
- if (!value || !vlen)
+ if (!value || !vlen || vlen > bufsize + 1)
return -EINVAL;
- /* diff = 0: 'value' has exacly the right size
- * diff > 0: 'value' has too many bytes; one leading zero is allowed that
- * makes the value a positive integer; error on more
- * diff < 0: 'value' is missing leading zeros
- */
- if (diff > 0) {
+ if (vlen > bufsize) {
/* skip over leading zeros that make 'value' a positive int */
if (*d == 0) {
vlen -= 1;
- diff--;
d++;
- }
- if (diff)
+ } else {
return -EINVAL;
+ }
}
- if (-diff >= bufsize)
- return -EINVAL;
ecc_digits_from_bytes(d, vlen, dest, ndigits);
--
2.43.0
