On Fri, Feb 23, 2024 at 06:20:27PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 23/02/2024 5:54 pm, Eric Biggers wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 23, 2024 at 04:42:11PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote: > >> Yes, and I agree. We're not looking to try and force this in with > >> underhand tactics. > >> > >> But a blind "nack to any SHA-1" is similarly damaging in the opposite > >> direction. > >> > > Well, reviewers have said they'd prefer that SHA-1 not be included and given > > some thoughtful reasons for that. But also they've given suggestions on how to > > make the SHA-1 support more palatable, such as splitting it into a separate > > patch and giving it a proper justification. > > > > All suggestions have been ignored. > > The public record demonstrates otherwise. > > But are you saying that you'd be happy if the commit message read > something more like: > > ---8<--- > For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256. > > The choice of hashes used lie with the platform firmware, not with > software, and is often outside of the users control. > > Even if we'd prefer to use SHA-256-only, if firmware elected to start us > with the SHA-1 and SHA-256 backs active, we still need SHA-1 to parse > the TPM event log thus far, and deliberately cap the SHA-1 PCRs in order > to safely use SHA-256 for everything else. > --- Please take some time to read through the comments that reviewers have left on previous versions of the patchset. - Eric
