Re: [PATCH RFC v9 04/51] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults using a configurable mask

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Wed, Jun 14, 2023 at 09:47:09AM -0700, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 11, 2023 at 11:25:12PM -0500,
> Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> > This will be used to determine whether or not an #NPF should be serviced
> > using a normal page vs. a guarded/gmem one.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  7 +++++++
> >  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >  2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > index b3bd24f2a390..c26f76641121 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -1445,6 +1445,13 @@ struct kvm_arch {
> >  	 */
> >  #define SPLIT_DESC_CACHE_MIN_NR_OBJECTS (SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE + 1)
> >  	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache split_desc_cache;
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * When set, used to determine whether a fault should be treated as
> > +	 * private in the context of protected VMs which use a separate gmem
> > +	 * pool to back private guest pages.
> > +	 */
> > +	u64 mmu_private_fault_mask;
> >  };
> >  
> >  struct kvm_vm_stat {
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> > index 780b91e1da9f..9b9e75aa43f4 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> > @@ -252,6 +252,39 @@ struct kvm_page_fault {
> >  
> >  int kvm_tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);
> >  
> > +static bool kvm_mmu_fault_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, u64 err)
> > +{
> > +	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
> > +	bool private_fault = false;
> > +	gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
> > +
> > +	slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
> > +	if (!slot) {
> > +		pr_debug("%s: no slot, GFN: 0x%llx\n", __func__, gfn);
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot)) {
> > +		pr_debug("%s: slot is not private, GFN: 0x%llx\n", __func__, gfn);
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (kvm->arch.mmu_private_fault_mask) {
> > +		private_fault = !!(err & kvm->arch.mmu_private_fault_mask);
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> 
> What's the convention of err? Can we abstract it by introducing a new bit
> PFERR_PRIVATE_MASK? The caller sets it based on arch specific value.
> the logic will be
>         .is_private = err & PFERR_PRIVATE_MASK;

I'm not sure I understand the question. 'err' is just the page fault flags,
and arch.mmu_private_fault_mask is something that can be set on a
per-platform basis when running in a mode where shared/private access
is recorded in the page fault flags during a #NPF.

I'm not sure how we'd keep the handling cross-platform by moving to a macro,
since TDX uses a different bit, and we'd want to be able to build a
SNP+TDX kernel that could run on either type of hardware.

Are you suggesting to reverse that and have err be set in a platform-specific
way and then use a common PFERR_PRIVATE_MASK that's software-defined and
consistent across platforms? That could work, but existing handling seems
to use page fault flags as-is, keeping the hardware-set values, rather than
modifying them to pass additional metadata, so it seems like it might
make things more confusing to make an exception to that here. Or are
there other cases where it's done that way?

> 
> 
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Handling below is for UPM self-tests and guests that treat userspace
> > +	 * as the authority on whether a fault should be private or not.
> > +	 */
> > +	private_fault = kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> 
> This code path is sad. One extra slot lookup and xarray look up.
> Without mmu lock, the result can change by other vcpu.
> Let's find a better way.

The intention was to rely on fault->mmu_seq to determine if a
KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES update came in after .private_fault was set so
that fault handling could be retried, but that doesn't happen until
kvm_faultin_pfn() which is *after* this is logged. So yes, I think there
is a race here, and the approach you took in your Misc. series of
keeping the kvm_mem_is_private() check inside kvm_faultin_pfn() is more
efficient/correct.

If we can figure out a way to handle checking the fault flags in a way
that works for both TDX/SNP (and KVM self-test use-case) we can
consolidate around that.

-Mike

> 
> > +
> > +out:
> > +	pr_debug("%s: GFN: 0x%llx, private: %d\n", __func__, gfn, private_fault);
> > +	return private_fault;
> > +}
> > +
> >  /*
> >   * Return values of handle_mmio_page_fault(), mmu.page_fault(), fast_page_fault(),
> >   * and of course kvm_mmu_do_page_fault().
> > @@ -301,7 +334,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
> >  		.max_level = KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL,
> >  		.req_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
> >  		.goal_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
> > -		.is_private = kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, cr2_or_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT),
> > +		.is_private = kvm_mmu_fault_is_private(vcpu->kvm, cr2_or_gpa, err),
> >  	};
> >  	int r;
> >  
> > -- 
> > 2.25.1
> > 
> 
> -- 
> Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>



[Index of Archives]     [Kernel]     [Gnu Classpath]     [Gnu Crypto]     [DM Crypt]     [Netfilter]     [Bugtraq]
  Powered by Linux