On Wed, Aug 24, 2022 at 02:04:09PM -0500, Denis Kenzior wrote: > When support for ECDSA keys was added, constraints for data & signature > sizes were never updated. This makes it impossible to use such keys via > keyctl API from userspace; fix that. Instead of "fix that" just describe the change. > Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys") > Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@xxxxxxxxx> > --- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > index 2f8352e88860..eca5671ad3f2 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > @@ -186,8 +186,28 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, > > len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); > info->key_size = len * 8; > - info->max_data_size = len; > - info->max_sig_size = len; > + > + if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) { > + /* > + * ECDSA key sizes are much smaller than RSA, and thus could > + * operate on (hashed) inputs that are larger than key size. > + * For example SHA384-hashed input used with secp256r1 > + * based keys. Set max_data_size to be at least as large as > + * the largest supported hash size (SHA512) > + */ > + info->max_data_size = 64; > + > + /* > + * Verify takes ECDSA-Sig (described in RFC 5480) as input, > + * which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in > + * ASN.1. Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here. > + */ > + info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2; > + } else { > + info->max_data_size = len; > + info->max_sig_size = len; > + } > + > info->max_enc_size = len; > info->max_dec_size = len; > info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT | > -- > 2.35.1 > The code change lgtm. BR, Jarkko