On Mon, Jun 27, 2022 at 05:20:27PM +0800, Tianjia Zhang wrote:
> The signature verification of SM2 needs to add the Za value and
> recalculate sig->digest, which requires the detection of the pkey_algo
> in public_key_verify_signature(). As Eric Biggers said, the pkey_algo
> field in sig is attacker-controlled and should be use pkey->pkey_algo
> instead of sig->pkey_algo, and secondly, if sig->pkey_algo is NULL, it
> will also cause signature verification failure.
>
> The software_key_determine_akcipher() already forces the algorithms
> are matched, so the SM3 algorithm is enforced in the SM2 signature,
> although this has been checked, we still avoid using any algorithm
> information in the signature as input.
>
> Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification")
> Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx # v5.10+
> Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 6 +++---
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index 7c9e6be35c30..3f17ee860f89 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -309,7 +309,8 @@ static int cert_sig_digest_update(const struct public_key_signature *sig,
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
> + /* SM2 signatures always use the SM3 hash algorithm */
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sm3", 0, 0);
So, why this should not validate sig->hash_alog *to be* "sm3"?
I.e. add instead guard before crypto_alloc_hash:
if (strncmp(sig->hash_algo, "sm3") != 0) {
/* error */
}
/* continue */
> if (IS_ERR(tfm))
> return PTR_ERR(tfm);
>
> @@ -414,8 +415,7 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
> if (ret)
> goto error_free_key;
>
> - if (sig->pkey_algo && strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 &&
> - sig->data_size) {
> + if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 && sig->data_size) {
> ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm);
> if (ret)
> goto error_free_key;
> --
> 2.24.3 (Apple Git-128)
>
BR, Jarkko
