Setting parts of the state to known constants is needed in
some Chacha applications to ensure that blocks can be processed
in parallel and that when needed (e.g. when encrypting disk
blocks) the algorithm can jump to an arbitrary part of the
output stream. In an RNG these are not required, and setting
the constants wastes cycles.
If (as we hope) the enemy does not know the state, then
this is more secure since it makes the chacha outputs
depend on more unknown bits.
If they can peek at the state or infer parts of it from
outputs, knowable values cannot possibly be worse than
known ones. This at least prevents them from using
pre-computed tables based on the known constants.
Signed-off-by: Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@xxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 655e327d425e..6df9e656a157 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -249,9 +249,7 @@ static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
- chacha_init_consts(chacha_state);
memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
- memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4);
chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block);
memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
--
2.25.1
