On Fri, May 13, 2022 at 04:56:58PM +0200, Ahmad Fatoum wrote: > Series applies on top of v5.18-rc6. Would be great if this could make it > into v5.19. > > v9 was here: > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20220506062553.1068296-1-a.fatoum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > Changelog is beneath each individual patch. Compared to v9, only code > change is checking whether CAAM can support blobbing at init-time for > CAAM revisions < 10 (such as LS1046A) to avoid a cryptic error message > at first use. > > > The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core > built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. > > Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique > never-disclosed device-specific key. > > There has been multiple discussions on how to represent this within the kernel: > > The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core > built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. > > Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique > never-disclosed device-specific key. There has been multiple > discussions on how to represent this within the kernel: > > - [RFC] crypto: caam - add red blobifier > Steffen implemented[1] a PoC sysfs driver to start a discussion on how to > best integrate the blob mechanism. > Mimi suggested that it could be used to implement trusted keys. > Trusted keys back then were a TPM-only feature. > > - security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support based on CAAM. > Udit Agarwal added[2] a new "secure" key type with the CAAM as backend. > The key material stays within the kernel only. > Mimi and James agreed that this needs a generic interface, not specific > to CAAM. Mimi suggested trusted keys. Jan noted that this could serve as > basis for TEE-backed keys. > > - [RFC] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type > Franck added[3] a new "caam_tk" key type based on Udit's work. This time > it uses CAAM "black blobs" instead of "red blobs", so key material stays > within the CAAM and isn't exposed to kernel in plaintext. > James voiced the opinion that there should be just one user-facing generic > wrap/unwrap key type with multiple possible handlers. > David suggested trusted keys. > > - Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support > Sumit reworked[4] trusted keys to support multiple possible backends with > one chosen at boot time and added a new TEE backend along with TPM. > This now sits in Jarkko's master branch to be sent out for v5.13 > > This patch series builds on top of Sumit's rework to have the CAAM as yet another > trusted key backend. > > The CAAM bits are based on Steffen's initial patch from 2015. His work had been > used in the field for some years now, so I preferred not to deviate too much from it. > > This series has been tested with dmcrypt[5] on an i.MX6Q/DL, i.MX8M[6] > and LS1028[7]. > > Looking forward to your feedback. > > Cheers, > Ahmad > > [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/1447082306-19946-2-git-send-email-s.trumtrar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20180723111432.26830-1-udit.agarwal@xxxxxxx/ > [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1551456599-10603-2-git-send-email-franck.lenormand@xxxxxxx/ > [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1604419306-26105-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@xxxxxxxxxx/ > [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210122084321.24012-2-a.fatoum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/DU2PR04MB8630D83FE9BBC0D782C4FAF595089@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > [7]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/49e1738c55c73819ee0e2cac0be74d81@xxxxxxxx/ > > --- > To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx> > To: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@xxxxxxx> > To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > To: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@xxxxxxx> > To: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > To: "David S. Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > To: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: David Gstir <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@xxxxxx> > Cc: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@xxxxxxx> > Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Andreas Rammhold <andreas@xxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Tim Harvey <tharvey@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Michael Walle <michael@xxxxxxxx> > Cc: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@xxxxxxxx> > Cc: linux-integrity@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Cc: keyrings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Cc: linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Cc: linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > Ahmad Fatoum (7): > KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support > KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material > crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap > crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator > KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys > doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source > MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM > > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 ++ > .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 60 +++++- > MAINTAINERS | 9 + > drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig | 3 + > drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile | 1 + > drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c | 182 ++++++++++++++++++ > drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 17 +- > drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h | 1 + > drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h | 4 +- > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +- > include/keys/trusted_caam.h | 11 ++ > include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h | 103 ++++++++++ > security/keys/Kconfig | 18 +- > security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 38 ++++ > security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 10 +- > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 80 ++++++++ > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 45 ++++- > 17 files changed, 563 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c > create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_caam.h > create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h > create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig > create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c > > -- > 2.30.2 > I can probably pick these unless objections? BR, Jarkko
