On Mon, May 09, 2022 at 09:50:58AM +0100, Giovanni Cabiddu wrote:
> On Fri, May 06, 2022 at 04:38:15PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Fri, May 06, 2022 at 10:54:07AM +0100, Giovanni Cabiddu wrote:
> > > On Fri, May 06, 2022 at 11:22:39AM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > > > On Fri, May 06, 2022 at 09:23:25AM +0100, Giovanni Cabiddu wrote:
> > > > > Use memzero_explicit(), instead of a memset(.., 0, ..) in the
> > > > > implementation of the algorithms, for buffers containing sensitive
> > > > > information to ensure they are wiped out before free.
> > > > >
> > > > > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > Reviewed-by: Adam Guerin <adam.guerin@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > Reviewed-by: Wojciech Ziemba <wojciech.ziemba@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c | 20 +++++++++----------
> > > > > drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c | 20 +++++++++----------
> > > > > 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c
> > > > > index 873533dc43a7..c42df18e02b2 100644
> > > > > --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c
> > > > > +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c
> > > > > @@ -637,12 +637,12 @@ static int qat_alg_aead_newkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
> > > > > return 0;
> > > > >
> > > > > out_free_all:
> > > > > - memset(ctx->dec_cd, 0, sizeof(struct qat_alg_cd));
> > > > > + memzero_explicit(ctx->dec_cd, sizeof(struct qat_alg_cd));
> > > >
> > > > This is for structure fields, why does memset() not work properly here?
> > > > The compiler should always call this, it doesn't know what
> > > > dma_free_coherent() does. You are referencing this pointer after the
> > > > memset() call so all should be working as intended here.
> > > >
> > > > Because of this, I don't see why this change is needed. Do you have
> > > > reports of compilers not calling memset() for all of this properly?
> > > Apologies, I had a wrong assumption.
> > > Based on a comment in the memzero_explicit() documentation I assumed it
> > > should be always used to zero sensitive data.
> > >
> > > * memzero_explicit - Fill a region of memory (e.g. sensitive
> > > * keying data) with 0s.
> >
> > Yes, that's what it is for, when the compiler thinks it is "smarter than
> > you" for stack variables.
> >
> > It's great for functions like this:
> > int foo(...)
> > {
> > struct key secret_key;
> >
> > do something and set secret_key...
> >
> > /* All done, clean up and return */
> > memset(&secret_key, 0, sizeof(secret_key));
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > For that, some compilers now go "hey, they just want to set this to 0
> > and then never touch it again, that is pointless, let's not call
> > memset() at all!".
> >
> > But when you call:
> > memset(foo->key, 0, sizeof(key));
> > do_something_with_foo(foo);
> >
> > the compiler can NOT go and ignore the call to memset() as it does not
> > know what do_something_with_foo() does. Or at least it better not.
> >
> > Try out this with a small example and look at the asm output for proof.
> Thanks for the explanation. It is clear now.
>
> >
> > You aren't the first to be confused about this, I see this happening at
> > least once a month with a patch to change code like you did. Don't know
> > why it keeps coming up, is this a checkpatch() recommentation?
> It is not a checkpatch recommendation.
> I got that assumption looking at kfree_sensitive() which contains a call
> to memzero_explicit(). This was introduced in 2020 by
> 8982ae527fbe ("mm/slab: use memzero_explicit() in kzfree()" when the
> function was still called kzfree().
> I assume now that the call to memzero_explicit() in kfree_sensitive() is
> also redundant, unless I'm missing something.
Maybe it is, it's hard to tell without running some build tests on
different compilers. Try it and see!
thanks,
greg k-h
