On Fri, Apr 15, 2022 at 7:49 AM Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 4/14/22 11:23, Jacky Li wrote:
> > There are 2 common cases when INIT_EX data file might not be
> > opened successfully and fail the sev initialization:
> >
> > 1. In user namespaces, normal user tasks (e.g. VMM) can change their
> > current->fs->root to point to arbitrary directories. While
> > init_ex_path is provided as a module param related to root file
> > system. Solution: use the root directory of init_task to avoid
> > accessing the wrong file.
> >
> > 2. Normal user tasks (e.g. VMM) don't have the privilege to access
> > the INIT_EX data file. Solution: open the file as root and
> > restore permissions immediately.
> >
> > Fixes: 3d725965f836 ("crypto: ccp - Add SEV_INIT_EX support")
> > Signed-off-by: Jacky Li <jackyli@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Reviewed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Looks good, just a quick question. Should there be any type of access
> checks before switching credentials? Should we check access to /dev/sev or
> such? Or is the capability to load the module enough?
I thought this was fine because regardless of if an admin sets
psp_init_on_probe=true or false, their intention is that people who
have rw access to /dev/sev can use the commands which require the PSP
to be init. In the case of psp_init_on_probe=false only rw users can
cause the file to be created. The case of psp_init_on_probe=true seems
a little less clear to me but if a user can modprobe ccp that seems
like sufficient privilege to create the file. What do you think, Tom?
