On 3/7/22 18:38, Eric Snowberg wrote:
On Mar 7, 2022, at 4:01 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Mon, 2022-03-07 at 18:06 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index 6b1ac5f5896a..49bb2ea7f609 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -108,6 +108,49 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
return ret;
}
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: Unused.
+ *
+ * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
+ * certificate as being ok to link.
CA = root CA here, right?
Yes, I’ll update the comment
Updating the comment is not enough. There's an existing function named
"x509_check_for_self_signed()" which determines whether the certificate
is self-signed.
Originally I tried using that function. However when the restrict link code is called,
all the necessary x509 information is no longer available. The code in
restrict_link_by_ca is basically doing the equivalent to x509_check_for_self_signed.
After verifying the cert has the CA flag set, the call to public_key_verify_signature
validates the cert is self signed.
Isn't x509_cert_parse() being called as part of parsing the certificate?
If so, it seems to check for a self-signed certificate every time. You
could add something like the following to x509_check_for_self_signed(cert):
pub->x509_self_signed = cert->self_signed = true;
This could then reduce the function in 3/4 to something like:
return payload->data[asym_crypto]->x509_self_signed;
Stefan
