Re: [PATCH 0/7] Common entropy source and DRNG management

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On Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 08:02:54AM +0100, Stephan Müller wrote:
> The current code base of the kernel crypto API random number support
> leaves the task to seed and reseed the DRNG to either the caller or
> the DRNG implementation. The code in crypto/drbg.c implements its own
> seeding strategy. crypto/ansi_cprng.c does not contain any seeding
> operation. The implementation in arch/s390/crypto/prng.c has yet
> another approach for seeding. Albeit the crypto_rng_reset() contains
> a seeding logic from get_random_bytes, there is no management of
> the DRNG to ensure proper reseeding or control which entropy sources
> are used for pulling data from.

ansi_cprng looks like unused code that should be removed, as does the s390 prng.

With that being the case, what is the purpose of this patchset?

- Eric



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