Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Am Freitag, 14. Januar 2022, 11:55:26 CET schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

> 
> > This looks all good to me, but as !->fips_allowed tests aren't skipped
> > over anymore now, it would perhaps make sense to make their failure
> > non-fatal in FIPS mode. Because in FIPS mode a failure could mean a
> > panic and some of the existing TVs might not pass because of e.g. some
> > key length checks or so active only for fips_enabled...
> 
> You mean a buggy non-FIPS algorithm that fails when tested in
> FIPS mode?  I guess we could skip the panic in that case if
> everyone is happy with that.  Stephan?

As we consider FIPS 140-3, we can allow a "degrated mode of operation". A 
degraded mode of operation disables only the algorithm that caused the 
failure. With a failing self test and not having a panic(), the offending 
algorithm implementation will not be available to the kernel crypto API and 
thus to a user.

In this case, we can replace the panic with a graceful error.

If that change is applied, I would like to mention to anybody that wants to 
backport the change: this change is not appropriate for FIPS 140-2.

Ciao
Stephan





[Index of Archives]     [Kernel]     [Gnu Classpath]     [Gnu Crypto]     [DM Crypt]     [Netfilter]     [Bugtraq]

  Powered by Linux