On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 10:10:15PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > If we must support this in the upstream kernel, then configure it via > CONFIG_RANDOM_SECURITY_THEATRE which redirects getrandom(2) and > /dev/[u]random to DRBG. I'd prefer that it be possible for someone to > put "random_security_theatre=0" on the boot command line which would > disable redirecting the interfaces to DRBG so if it turns out that > DRBG *is* less secure, we can give advice on how to turn it off > without requiring a patched kernel. :-) In this case, why not do it the other way around ? Instead of having yet-another config option, just indicate that fips-like randoms are enabled at boot via "random_security_theatre=1". Distros have their solution which can even be documented for their customers and that's done. Nobody uses it by default, the name is discouraging enough, but for those who know they want it, it's easy to turn it on, and at the same time it delivers them the reminder about what all this really is. Willy
