A subsequent patch will make the DH implementation to reject any input
domain parameter set with ->group_id == DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN in FIPS mode.
However, as the keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE) implementation simply passes
forward keys from userspace, it does not (and cannot) set ->group_id to
anything else than DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN.
In order to still allow for keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE) to work on approved
domain parameters passed in from userspace in FIPS mode, make
crypto_dh_decode_key() to compare them against any of the known groups and
set ->group_id upon having found a match, if any.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@xxxxxxx>
---
crypto/dh_helper.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/dh_helper.c b/crypto/dh_helper.c
index ec9c4cdf57b2..b8a726b610a2 100644
--- a/crypto/dh_helper.c
+++ b/crypto/dh_helper.c
@@ -470,6 +470,36 @@ get_safe_prime_group(enum dh_group_id group_id)
return NULL;
}
+static enum dh_group_id lookup_group_id(const char *g, size_t g_size,
+ const char *p, size_t p_size)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* All safe-prime groups use a generator of g == 2. */
+ while (g_size && !*g) {
+ ++g;
+ --g_size;
+ }
+
+ if (g_size != 1 || *g != 2)
+ return DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN;
+
+ while (p_size && !*p) {
+ ++p;
+ --p_size;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(safe_prime_groups); ++i) {
+ if (safe_prime_groups[i].p_size != p_size)
+ continue;
+
+ if (!memcmp(safe_prime_groups[i].p, p, p_size))
+ return safe_prime_groups[i].group_id;
+ }
+
+ return DH_GROUP_ID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
static inline u8 *dh_pack_data(u8 *dst, u8 *end, const void *src, size_t size)
{
if (!dst || size > end - dst)
@@ -568,6 +598,9 @@ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params)
if (memchr_inv(params->p, 0, params->p_size) == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
+ params->group_id = lookup_group_id(params->g, params->g_size,
+ params->p, params->p_size);
+
} else {
const struct safe_prime_group *g;
--
2.26.2
