On Fri, Dec 3, 2021 at 4:42 PM Matteo Croce <mcroce@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 3, 2021 at 11:20 PM Alexei Starovoitov > <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Fri, Dec 3, 2021 at 2:06 PM Luca Boccassi <bluca@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > On Fri, 2021-12-03 at 11:37 -0800, Alexei Starovoitov wrote: > > > > On Fri, Dec 3, 2021 at 11:36 AM Matteo Croce > > > > <mcroce@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 3, 2021 at 8:22 PM Alexei Starovoitov > > > > > <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 3, 2021 at 11:18 AM Matteo Croce > > > > > > <mcroce@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From: Matteo Croce <mcroce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This series add signature verification for BPF files. > > > > > > > The first patch implements the signature validation in the > > > > > > > kernel, > > > > > > > the second patch optionally makes the signature mandatory, > > > > > > > the third adds signature generation to bpftool. > > > > > > > > > > > > Matteo, > > > > > > > > > > > > I think I already mentioned that it's no-go as-is. > > > > > > We've agreed to go with John's suggestion. > > > > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > > > my previous attempt was loading a whole ELF file and parsing it in > > > > > kernel. > > > > > In this series I just validate the instructions against a > > > > > signature, > > > > > as with kernel CO-RE libbpf doesn't need to mangle it. > > > > > > > > > > Which suggestion? I think I missed this one.. > > > > > > > > This talk and discussion: > > > > https://linuxplumbersconf.org/event/11/contributions/947/ > > > > > > Thanks for the link - but for those of us who don't have ~5 hours to > > > watch a video recording, would you mind sharing a one line summary, > > > please? Is there an alternative patch series implementing BPF signing > > > that you can link us so that we can look at it? Just a link or > > > googlable reference would be more than enough. > > > > It's not 5 hours and you have to read slides and watch > > John's presentation to follow the conversation. > > So, If I have understood correctly, the proposal is to validate the > tools which loads the BPF (e.g. perf, ip) with fs-verity, and only > allow BPF loading from those validated binaries? > That's nice, but I think that this could be complementary to the > instructions signature. > Imagine a validated binary being exploited somehow at runtime, that > could be vector of malicious BPF program load. > Can't we have both available, and use one or other, or even both > together depending on the use case? I'll let John comment.
